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THE SURPRISING LESSONS FROM PLEA 
BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF TERROR 
Lucian E. Dervan∗∇ 
ABSTRACT 
Since September 11, 2001, several hundred individuals have been 
convicted of terrorism related charges. Of these convictions, over 
80% resulted from a plea of guilty. It is surprising and 
counterintuitive that such a large percentage of these cases are 
resolved in this manner, yet, even when prosecuting suspected 
terrorists caught attempting suicide attacks, the power of the plea 
bargaining machine exerts a striking influence. As a result, a close 
examination of these extraordinary cases offers important insights 
into the forces that drive the plea bargaining system. Utilizing these 
insights, this article critiques two divergent and dominant theories of 
plea bargaining present in the current literature—the administrative 
theory and the shadow-of-trial theory. The article then offers a new 
theory of plea bargaining that both expands on these existing theories 
and combines relevant aspects of each into one overarching model. In 
doing so, this article provides for a greater understanding of the 
function of the plea bargaining machine in the criminal justice 
process, the roles played by its actors, and the factors influencing its 
operation. 
INTRODUCTION 
An hour and a half from Paris, American Airlines Flight 63 cruised 
39,000 feet above the Atlantic Ocean. Inside, protected from the 
negative 70 degree temperatures outside the steel fuselage, sat 183 
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passengers, many of whom had already drifted off to sleep. In row 
twenty-nine, however, a tall, unkempt man sat restlessly, his mind 
likely full of thoughts of both the past that had brought him to this 
place and the task that lay ahead. He had attempted to board the same 
flight the day before, but the fact that he had paid cash for his ticket 
and was carrying no checked luggage so concerned authorities at 
Charles de Gaulle Airport that they detained him for interrogation 
until well after the first flight to Miami departed. Now, a mere 
twenty-four hours later, he was in his desired perch, his message to 
the world concealed within the soles of his high-top basketball 
shoes.1 
The first scream jolted Thierry Dugeon from his deep sleep in row 
thirty-nine, the air already ripe with the smell of sulfur. As his eyes 
adjusted to the scene, he saw the man in front of him fighting off a 
flight attendant who was grasping for his feet and screaming, “I need 
some help, I need some help.”2 As Dugeon lunged forward and 
restrained the man’s arms, five other passengers and crewmembers 
raced toward them and tackled the stranger. As belts were passed 
down the rows to create restraints, the man’s shoes, which were 
smoldering, were dowsed with water.3 Once restrained, a doctor 
injected the enraged passenger with a sedative, and the plane fell 
silent. A short while later, outside in the frigid air, two F-15 fighter 
jets rose out of the dark sky and guided the plane safely to Boston’s 
Logan Airport.4   
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Pam Belluck, Crew Grabs Man; Explosive Feared, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at A1; Dana 
Canedy, A Nation Challenged: The Travelers; A “Strange” Traveler Acted, and the Passengers Reacted, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at A1; Michael Elliott, The Shoe Bomber’s World, TIME, Feb. 25, 2002, at 
46, available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001865,00.html.  
 2. Belluck, supra note 1. 
 3. The above described events are eerily similar to the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest 
Flight 253 in December 2009 by the “Christmas Day Bomber.” In a similar style to Richard Reid, Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab slipped through airport security by hiding his bomb materials in his underwear. 
Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at A1 (noting the similarities between the “Christmas Day Bomber” and the 
“Shoe Bomber”); see also Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoff & Evan Thomas, The Radicalization of 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 2010, at 37; Charlie Savage, Nigerian Man is 
Indicted in Attempted Plan Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A14. It is as of yet unknown whether 
Abdulmutallab will plead guilty to his alleged act of terrorism, but the observations and analysis offered 
in this article will shed considerable light on the likelihood that he will bypass trial in return for a plea.  
 4. Belluck, supra note 1; Canedy, supra note 1. 
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Less than a year later, on October 4, 2002, that tall, unkempt man, 
Richard Reid, pleaded guilty to eight felony charges, but received no 
leniency from the prosecution. The charges included attempted 
murder, attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, and 
attempted destruction of an aircraft.5 It is puzzling that a man who 
spent years training in Afghanistan and traveling the world for al 
Qaeda scouting for vulnerable targets would choose to plead guilty in 
a court whose legitimacy he refused even to recognize.6 Though Reid 
had certainly not lost his fervor for al Qaeda, something stronger than 
his hatred of America prompted his decision to plead guilty, and Reid 
is certainly not the only terrorist to so acquiesce.  
Obtaining the exact number of defendants who have pleaded guilty 
to terrorism or terrorism related charges since September 11, 2001 is 
impossible because the federal government refuses to release such 
information. It is estimated though that there have been several 
hundred convictions of which over 80% resulted from a plea of 
guilty.7 Although the plea rate for terrorism cases is certainly lower 
than the plea rate for other federal offenses, which on average has 
remained above 95% for almost every year since 1999, a plea rate in 
excess of 80% is remarkably high given the psyche of those who 
engage in the acts being prosecuted.8 Consider that Richard Reid 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1, U.S. v. Richard Colvin Reid, CR NO. 02-
10013-WGY (D. Mass. Jan. 17, 2003) (containing the government’s arguments as to why Richard Reid 
should be sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison).  
 6. See Elliott, supra note 1, at 49 (detailing Reid’s travels to France, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan prior to his attempted bombing of American Airlines Flight 63).  
 7. While the federal government has previously released both criminal prosecution data and 
sentencing data through both the United States Sentencing Commission and Transactional Records 
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), information related to terrorism prosecutions has not been made public 
through these forums. In 2006, however, the Department of Justice released a Counterterrorism White 
Paper, which stated that since 2001 there had been 261 terrorism convictions in 45 jurisdictions, of 
which 83% were the result of a plea bargain. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE 
PAPER 13–14 (June 22, 2006). Also in 2006, The Center on Law and Security released a study that 
estimated there had been 307 terrorism convictions since 2001, of which 82% were the result of a plea 
bargain. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., TERRORISM TRIAL REPORT CARD: U.S. EDITION 4 (2006), available at 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/TTRCComplete.pdf; see also Richard Schmitt, For the 
Justice Department, a Welcome Conviction, LA TIMES, at A15, Apr. 26, 2006 (“[M]ost of the 
convictions the Justice Department has won since the Sept. 11 attacks have come by defendants pleading 
guilty to crimes rather than by the government proving its case in a court of law.”). 
 8. Lucian E. Dervan, Plea Bargaining’s Survival: Financial Crimes Plea Bargaining, a Continued 
Triumph in a Post-Enron World, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 476 (Fall 2007).  
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rejected the authority of the American justice system and expressed 
his continued allegiance to al Qaeda only moments before subjecting 
himself to the judgment of a United States district court judge. 
While it may be counterintuitive that such a large percentage of 
terrorism prosecutions are resolved through plea bargains, it appears 
that even in these extraordinary cases the power of the plea 
bargaining machine exerts a striking influence. As a result, a close 
examination of these extraordinary cases offers important insights 
into the forces that drive the plea bargaining system. Utilizing these 
insights, this article will critique two divergent and dominant theories 
of plea bargaining in the current literature and offer a modified theory 
that harmonizes the conflict between these two perspectives. 
In Section I, this article examines the history of plea bargaining 
and the two theories which dominate the current literature.9 The first 
theory, the administrative theory, argues that plea bargaining 
triumphed because of the rise of prosecutorial power.10 Such 
literature argues that prosecutors have become so powerful due to 
their control of charging decisions and sentencing ranges that they 
now force defendants to accept plea bargains for which they alone 
have determined the appropriate punishment in an administrative 
fashion. The second theory, the shadow-of-trial theory, argues that 
both prosecutors and defendants participate in the plea bargaining 
process and engage in a mutually beneficial contractual negotiation.11 
In this model, each party forecasts the expected sentence after trial 
and the probability of acquittal. The parties then come to a resolution 
that contains some related proportional discount.  
In Section II, the article examines three terrorism prosecutions and 
furthers our understanding of the plea bargaining machine by 
discussing three features of these cases.12 The first feature is that 
defendants sometimes determine that the inherent benefits of 
pleading guilty, even without an offer of additional benefits from the 
government, are a sufficient incentive to forego trial. In these cases, 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See infra Part I (regarding conflicting theories of plea bargaining). 
 10. See infra Part I.A (describing the “administrative theory” of plea bargaining).  
 11. See infra Part I.B (describing the “shadow-of-trial theory” of plea bargaining). 
 12. See infra Part II (describing the Richard Reid, Lodi, California, and Lackawanna Six cases).  
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the plea bargain is with the criminal justice system itself and not the 
government, yet it is a plea bargain nonetheless because a guilty plea 
is exchanged for perceived benefits. The second feature is that 
defendants, as well as prosecutors, exercise considerable control over 
the factors that influence decisions regarding whether a guilty plea 
will be entered and what, if any, leniency will be offered in return. 
Some of these factors are present in all criminal cases, some are 
applicable in each type of criminal charge, and some are unique to 
particular defendants. By demonstrating the significant role played by 
defendants in the system, this article will challenge the contention of 
the administrative theory that defendants are unwilling participants in 
the plea bargaining machine and unable to exercise real influence 
over the outcome of the process. The third feature is that after both 
parties have influenced the factors that affect the prosecution’s and 
the defense’s analysis of the barriers to success at trial and the 
barriers to success of the plea bargain, the prosecution makes a final 
administrative decision regarding the appropriate punishment. In 
more than 80% of terrorism cases and 95% of federal prosecutions, 
the defendant then accepts the government’s offer.  
In Section III, building upon the aspects of the plea bargaining 
machine examined in Section II, this article will propose a new 
theory of plea bargaining that both expands on the administrative and 
shadow-of-trial theories and combines relevant aspects of each into 
one overarching theory of plea bargaining.13 Through such an 
analysis, one will gain a greater understanding of the function of the 
plea bargaining machine in the criminal justice process, the roles 
played by its actors, and the factors influencing its operation.  
I.  CONFLICTING THEORIES REGARDING THE PLEA BARGAINING 
MACHINE 
While plea bargaining pre-dates the American criminal justice 
system, “its evolution into a force that consumes over 95% of 
defendants in America is a phenomenon confined predominately to 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See infra Part III (examining the dual chambers of the plea bargaining machine).  
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the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”14 George Fisher begins his 
seminal work on plea bargaining, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, with a 
somber expression of remorse over the machine’s rise to prominence: 
“There is no glory in plea bargaining. In place of a noble clash for 
truth, plea bargaining gives us a skulking truce. . . . But though its 
victory merits no fanfare, plea bargaining has triumphed. . . . The 
battle has been lost for some time. . . . Victory goes to the 
powerful.”15 While the battle may have been lost for some time, 
understanding the evolution and future of plea bargaining remains a 
challenging endeavor.  
As alluded to in Fisher’s statement above, a general consensus has 
evolved within plea bargaining scholarship that plea bargaining 
became a dominant force as a result of prosecutors gaining increasing 
power and control in an ever more complex criminal justice system. 
As prosecutors’ powers to operate within and manipulate the system 
grew, their ability to create incentives for defendants to plead guilty 
also escalated. For instance, through analysis of plea bargaining in 
Massachusetts, Fisher argues that as the criminal justice system 
became more sophisticated, prosecutors gained the power to use 
selective charge bargaining to offer reduced sentences for those 
willing to negotiate.16  
                                                                                                                 
 14. Dervan, supra note 8, at 478. 
 15. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 
1 (2003) (emphasis added); see also George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 
(2000). For a discussion of scholarship on plea bargaining generally and the debate over whether plea 
bargaining is an appropriate part of our criminal justice system, see Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched 
Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717 (2006).  
 16. FISHER, supra note 15, at 210 (“[Sentencing Guidelines] invest prosecutors with the power, 
moderated only by the risk of loss at trial, to dictate many sentences simply by choosing one set of 
charges over another.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 40 (1979); Dervan, supra note 8, at 478. For a discussion of charge bargaining and its use by 
prosecutors, see Joy A. Boyd, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of Justice’s Plea Bargain 
Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor’s Power Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 591, 592 (2004) (“Not only may a prosecutor choose whether to pursue any given case, 
but she also decides which charges to file.”); Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating 
Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1066–67 (2006) (“Like most plea agreements in federal or state courts, the standard 
D.C. federal plea agreement starts by identifying the charges to which the defendant will plead guilty 
and the charges or potential charges that the government in exchange agrees not to prosecute.”); Dervan, 
supra note 8, at 478; Jon J. Lambiras, White-Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity Despite 
Uniform Guidelines?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 512 (2003) (“Charging decisions are a critical sentencing 
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Key to the success of prosecutors’ use of increasing powers to 
create incentives that attracted defendants was their ability to 
structure plea agreements that included significant differences 
between the sentence one received in return for pleading guilty and 
the sentence one risked if he or she lost at trial.17 In a 1981 article on 
plea bargaining, Albert Alschuler wrote of this “sentencing 
differential” and stated, “Criminal defendants today plead guilty in 
overwhelming numbers primarily because they perceive that this 
action is likely to lead to more lenient treatment than would follow 
conviction at trial. A number of studies suggest that this perception is 
justified.”18 Among such studies was an examination by David 
Brereton and Jonathan Casper that analyzed robbery and burglary 
defendants in three California jurisdictions.19 The results were 
shocking and illustrated that defendants who exercised their 
constitutional right to a trial received significantly higher sentences 
than those who worked with prosecutors to reach an agreement.20 Not 
                                                                                                                 
matter and are left solely to the discretion of the prosecutor. When determining which charges to bring, 
prosecutors may often choose from more than one statutory offense.”); Geraldine Szott Moohr, 
Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current White Collar Cases and the 
Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 177 (2004) (“The power of the prosecutor to charge is 
two-fold; the power to indict or not . . . and the power to decide what offenses to charge.”). 
 17. Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1425, 1425 (2002) [hereinafter Bibas, Bringing Moral Values] (“The criminal justice system uses 
large sentence discounts to induce guilty pleas. Of course these discounts exert pressure on defendants to 
plead guilty.”). Along with sentencing differentials, of course, are considerations by the defendant of the 
likelihood of success at trial. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Shadow of Trial] (“In short, the classic shadow-of-
trial model predicts that the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence largely 
determine plea bargains.”).   
 18. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 652–53 
(1981). Alschuler goes on to state, “Although the empirical evidence is not of one piece, the best 
conclusion probably is that in a great many cases the sentence differential in America assumes shocking 
proportions.” Id. at 654–56; see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea 
Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 251 (2006) (“While practitioners disagree 
about the acceptability of a large sentence differential between the post-plea and post-trial sentence, they 
agree that such a differential is common.”).   
 19. David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does it Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing and 
the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 45, 55–59 (1981–82); accord H. Joo Shin, 
Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing and Parole Process, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 27 
(1973) (finding that charge reduction directly results in reduction of the maximum sentence available 
and indirectly results in lesser actual time served).    
 20. Brereton & Casper, supra note 19, at 55–59; accord Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of 
Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1382 (2000) 
(“The differential in sentencing between those who plead and those convicted after trial reflects the 
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limiting themselves to a mere observation of sentencing trends, the 
researchers also made an insightful statement regarding the impact of 
high differentials on the rates of plea bargaining:  
The point of the preceding discussion is simple enough: when 
guilty plea rates are high, expect to find differential sentencing. 
We believe that recent arguments to the effect that differentials 
are largely illusory do not withstand serious scrutiny, even 
though this revisionist challenge has been valuable in forcing us 
to examine more closely what is too often taken to be self-
evidently true.21 
Significant differentials, Brereton and Casper argued, are a tool 
used to increase plea bargaining rates by increasing the incentives for 
negotiation.22 
A.  The Administrative Theory of Plea Bargaining 
The scholarship described above regarding the rise of plea 
bargaining has led to a theory pertaining to the modern operation of 
the plea bargaining machine. This theory emphasizes the role of the 
prosecution in dictating the terms and conditions of the bargain and 
relegates the defendant to the position of an unwilling, passive 
participant whose only power rests in the ability to accept or reject 
the government’s offer. This article will entitle this model the 
administrative theory of plea bargaining because at its most 
                                                                                                                 
judgment that defendants who insist upon a trial are doing something blameworthy.”); Tung Yin, Not a 
Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement in Sentencing Under the 
Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 443 (1995) (“Curiously, the arena of plea bargaining pits the 
concepts of duress and consideration against each other: a large sentencing differential makes it more 
likely that a defendant is coerced into pleading guilty, and yet it also increases the benefit offered in 
exchange for the guilty plea.”).  
 21. Brereton & Casper, supra note 19, at 69.  
 22. Id. at 45 (“It is this sentence differential (whether conceived of as a reward to guilty pleaders or 
as a punishment of those who waste the court’s time by ‘needless’ trials) which has traditionally been 
seen as the engine driving the plea-bargaining assembly line.”); see also Givelber, supra note 20, at 
1382 (“The pragmatic justification for differential sentencing is simple and powerful: we want those 
charged with crimes to plead guilty, and differential sentencing provides an accused with a strong 
incentive to do just that.”). 
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pronounced, the theory portrays prosecutors as administrative figures 
handing down punishment in the place of the courts.23   
Fisher alludes to the idea of prosecutors as the ultimate wielders of 
an administrative type decision-making power in his work Plea 
Bargaining’s Triumph: 
To track the course of plea bargaining’s rise, we must discover 
how prosecutors, who had an almost inherent interest in plea 
bargaining, secured the power to make it happen, and why 
judges, who inherently had the power to make it happen, began 
to see it as in their interest. . . . And criminal defendants, who 
held a nominally absolute power to plead or not to plead but who 
found themselves hopelessly undefended, must play a real if 
complicated part.24 
A more conscious description of defendants as passive players is 
contained in Donald Gifford’s 1983 work entitled Meaningful Reform 
of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion.25 
Gifford begins his piece by casting defendants as mere recipients of 
the government’s administrative verdicts in the form of plea offers: 
[P]lea bargains are not consensual agreements entered into by 
defendants after adversarial negotiation. Rather, the prosecutor 
substantially dictates the terms of plea agreements in most cases. 
“Plea bargaining” is in reality the prosecutor’s unilateral 
administrative determination of the level of the defendant’s 
criminal culpability and the appropriate punishment for him.26 
                                                                                                                 
 23. It is worthy of mention that the description regarding the administrative and shadow-of-trial 
theories presented in this article utilizes several strong pieces that establish the outer poles of this debate. 
While many other articles may fall, sometimes unknowingly, somewhere between these two extremes, 
this article seeks to definitively address the conflict present in the literature and resolve the inherent 
discrepancies between the two opposing theories.  
 24. FISHER, supra note 15, at 859 (emphasis added). 
 25. Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37 (1983). 
 26. Id. at 39 (“In reality, there is little of the ‘give-and-take’ which is axiomatic to the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of plea bargaining.”); Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management Criminal 
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For defendants in the administrative theory, therefore, there is no 
significant role other than what Fisher termed two decades later the 
“nominally absolute power” to accept the government’s offer.27 
Gifford even uses the term “administrative determination” in 
describing the government’s role in the plea bargaining machine.28 
This view of the parties’ roles in plea bargaining is also discussed by 
Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, who state in their piece entitled 
Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains that the “American 
criminal justice systems have become administrative systems run by 
executive-branch officials.”29 As applied to the plea bargaining 
process, Wright and Miller state, “Guilty pleas could just as easily 
reflect prosecutorial domination and an administrative system run 
amok.”30 
In his article entitled Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 
Michael M. O’Hear argues that the modern plea bargaining process is 
essentially administrative in nature.31 O’Hear rejects the notion that 
plea bargains result from a form of contractual negotiation involving 
two participating parties: 
                                                                                                                 
Mediation, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 571, 605 (2004) (“Prosecutors already wield nearly absolute power in the 
criminal arena and exert that power in the plea bargaining setting.”); see, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to 
do is a due process violation of the most basic sort . . . and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of 
action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is ‘patently 
unconstitutional’. . . . But in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining, there is no such element of 
punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 50, 54 (1968) (“Administrative considerations are far more basic. ‘We are running a machine,’ a 
Los Angeles trial assistant declares. ‘We know we have to grind them out fast.’”).   
 27. FISHER, supra note 15, at 859. 
 28. Gifford, supra note 25, at 45 (“[T]he process of determining what charges the defendant will 
plead to is more an administrative determination than a true negotiation.”). 
 29. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1409, 1409 (2003). 
 30. Id. at 1415; see also Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence 
Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2037 (2006) (“The enormous power of federal prosecutors to 
persuade suspects to accept guilty pleas is well documented.”); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative 
System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2123 (1998) (“The substantive evaluation of the 
evidence and assessment of the defendant’s responsibility is not made in court at all, but within the 
executive branch, in the office of the prosecutor.”); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 137 (2008) (“Many scholars have observed that our criminal justice system today 
is more administrative than adversarial . . . . [Rather than trials assessing evidence,] the meaningful 
screening of cases now may be prosecutorial rather than judicial.”). 
 31. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407 (2008). 
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Moreover, it is easy to overstate the extent to which plea 
bargaining really is bargaining. As noted previously, the practice 
often resembles shopping in a supermarket—with one important 
exception: the dissatisfied defendant is not free to move on to a 
different store in search of lower prices. . . . [W]hen 
prosecutorial lenience is the only reliable means to avoid a 
draconian sentence, the prosecutor can effectively dictate the 
terms of the “deal.”32 
Even Justice David H. Souter has argued that defendants in plea 
negotiations often stand in no position to dictate the terms of the deal. 
In his dissent in United States v. Mezzanatto, he wrote, with regard to 
waivers of appeal in plea agreements, that defendants are “generally 
in no position to challenge demands for these waivers, and the use of 
waiver provisions as contracts of adhesion has become accepted 
practice.”33 
Taken to the extreme, the administrative plea bargaining theory 
argues that prosecutors have become so powerful that defendants 
have even lost what Fisher termed the “nominally absolute power to 
plead or not to plead.”34 Such an argument was advanced by John 
Langbein in describing plea bargaining as a form of torture and the 
defendants as unwilling victims of coercive incentives: 
We coerce the accused against whom we find probable cause to 
confess his guilt. To be sure, our means are much politer; we use 
no rack, no thumbscrew, no Spanish boot to mash his legs. But 
like the Europeans of distant centuries who did employ those 
machines, we make it terribly costly for an accused to claim his 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 425; see also David Aaron, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor’s 
Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3035–36 (1999) (“[T]he 
coercive power of the prosecutor and the general disequilibrium between the government and the 
defendant challenge the assertion that a plea bargain is a voluntary agreement or contract.”).  
 33. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995); see also Robert Elias, The Law of 
Personhood: A Review of Markus Dirk Dubber’s Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of 
Victims’ Rights, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 225, 240–41 (2004) (book review) (“While it promotes efficiency, it 
rarely produces any bargain and typically amounts to an unconditional surrender.”). 
 34. FISHER, supra note 15, at 859. 
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right to the constitutional safeguard of trial. We threaten him 
with a materially increased sanction if he avails himself of his 
right and is thereafter convicted. This sentencing differential is 
what makes plea bargaining coercive. There is, of course, a 
difference between having your limbs crushed if you refuse to 
confess, or suffering some extra years of imprisonment if you 
refuse to confess, but the difference is of degree, not kind. Plea 
bargaining, like torture, is coercive.35 
Under this account, the plea bargaining machine is a torturous 
contraption into which no defendant would willingly step, yet 
defendants are forced to accept the government’s offer because they 
are powerless to influence the bargain and risk too much by 
proceeding to trial.36  
B.  The Shadow-of-Trial Theory of Plea Bargaining 
The administrative plea bargaining theory, however, is not the only 
methodology currently being debated in plea bargaining scholarship. 
Another line of scholarship has evolved describing more balanced 
roles for the prosecution and the defense in the plea bargaining 
machine. This theory has been termed the shadow-of-trial plea 
bargaining theory.37   
                                                                                                                 
 35. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12–13 (1978); see also 
David T. Johnson, American Law in Japanese Perspective, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 778–79 
(2003) (In discussing plea bargaining, which Kagan describes as “adversarial legalism’s ugly child,” 
Johnson states, “I am no fan of plea bargaining. It tortures the truth, coerces defendants, undermines 
consistency, generates injustice, and concentrates enormous power—to charge, try, and sentence—in the 
prosecutor’s hands.”).    
 36. While less extreme, Donald Gifford wrote of the coercive nature of plea bargaining in his article 
entitled Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, stating, “The 
sentencing differential between defendants who are convicted at trial and those who accept the 
prosecutor’s offer to plead guilty is so pervasive and so substantial that few defendants are foolhardy 
enough to risk testing the prosecutor’s determination of the ‘value’ of their case.” Gifford, supra note 
25, at 46. 
 37. Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH & LEE L. 
REV. 73, 74 (2009) (“The dominant theoretical model of plea bargaining—so-called ‘trial shadow 
theory’—predicts that, once charged, innocent and guilty persons alike almost always act rationally by 
pleading guilty rather than contesting guilt at trial.”); see HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 31–32 (Little, Brown & Company Limited) (1966) (“At every stage of this informal 
process of pre-trial dispositions . . . decisions are in part informed by expectations of what the jury will 
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In their 1992 article entitled Plea Bargaining as Contract, Robert 
E. Scott and William J. Stuntz argue that plea bargaining’s durability 
rests on the fact that parties can and will reach mutually beneficial 
agreements:  
Criminal trials are costly for defendants, and even more so for 
prosecutors. These costs can be saved, and the gains split 
between the parties, by reaching a bargain early in the criminal 
process. Consequently, in cases where both parties understand 
that conviction at trial is virtually certain—a description that fits 
many, many cases—the incentive to bargain is simple. Savings in 
adjudication costs represent the gains from trade.38 
With regard to cases in which the likelihood of conviction is less 
certain, Scott and Stuntz conclude that the bargained for agreement 
will be “based upon the prosecutor’s estimate of the strength of the 
case at the time of bargaining plus the expected savings in transaction 
costs from shifting prosecutorial efforts to pleas rather than trials.”39 
In all criminal cases, therefore, the plea bargain represents a contract 
negotiated by both parties that largely reflects the likelihood of 
                                                                                                                 
do. Thus, the jury is not controlling merely the immediate case . . . , but the host of cases . . . which are 
destined to be disposed of by the pre-trial process.”); Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain 
Justice,” 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 512–14, 523 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as 
Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Bargaining as Compromise]; 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309–17 (1983) 
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Market System]; Edward A. Ruttenburg, Plea Bargaining Analytically—The 
Nash Solution to the Landes Model, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 353 (1979); William M. Landes, An 
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66–69 (1971); Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992); see also Candace Zierdt & 
Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policy, 96 
KY. L.J. 1 (2007) (examining corporate deferred prosecutions agreements through contract policing 
theories). 
 38. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 37, at 1935 (emphasis added); see also Gabriel Hallevy, The Defense 
Attorney as Mediator in Plea Bargains, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 495, 497 (2009) (“In a plea bargain, 
the power to determine the fate of the case is passed on to the parties who set out its terms in a 
contractual agreement. Within the framework of a plea bargain, it is possible for the parties to reach 
agreement regarding every detail connected with the criminal proceedings that is within their power to 
determine.”). 
 39. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 37, at 1948. 
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conviction at trial and the likely sentence resulting from such 
conviction.40   
In his 2004 article entitled Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, Stephanos Bibas expands on this theory of plea bargaining, but 
does not reject the role of the defendant in the process.41 Instead, 
Bibas argues that the shadow-of-trial theory should be expanded to 
account for additional factors that influence the contractual 
negotiation between the parties beyond merely the likelihood of 
success:42   
First, there are many structural impediments that distort 
bargaining in various cases. Poor lawyering, agency costs, and 
lawyers’ self interest are prime examples, as are bail rules and 
pretrial detention. The structural skewing of bargains has grown 
in the last two decades with the proliferation of mandatory 
sentences and sentencing guidelines. . . . Second, the shadow-of-
trial model assumes that the actors are fundamentally rational. 
Recent scholarship on negotiation and behavioral law and 
economics, however, undercuts this strong assumption of 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Under the shadow-of-trial theory, therefore, there are three fundamental questions that dictate the 
terms of the bargained for agreement:  
  (1) The trial sentence anticipated if the case were tried and resulted in a conviction; 
  (2) The likelihood that a trial will result in a conviction; and 
  (3) The resource costs of trying the case. 
According to one author, “Assuming that prosecutors seek to maximize and defendants seek to minimize 
sentences, the price of any plea should be the product of the anticipated trial sentence and the likelihood 
of conviction, discounted by some factor to reflect the resources saved by not having to try the case.” 
Covey, supra note 37, at 77–78; see also Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–66 
(“Proponents of the shadow-of-trial model do not deny that factors other than the merits influence 
settlements at the margins . . . . By and large, though, scholars view the shadow of trial as the 
overwhelming determinant of plea bargaining. Implicitly, they treat other factors as minor refinements 
to a basically sound model.”). 
 41. See Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2464; see also Russell Covey, Reconsidering the 
Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 215 (2007) 
(“Some of the pioneering work in this area—by Professor Bibas and others—accepts plea bargaining as 
a given and examines the impact that cognitive bias has on the bargaining decisions made by prosecutors 
and defendants. That work concludes that cognitive bias sometimes impedes defendants from accepting 
utility-enhancing plea offers and less frequently induces defendants to accept utility-diminishing plea 
bargains.”). 
 42. Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465 (“By and large . . . scholars view the shadow of 
trial as the overwhelming determinant of plea bargaining. Implicitly, they treat other factors as minor 
refinements to a basically sound model.”). 
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rationality. Instead, overconfidence, self-serving biases, framing, 
denial mechanisms, anchoring, discount rates, and risk 
preferences all skew bargains.43  
Based on this approach to the shadow-of-trial theory, Bibas argues 
that the original analysis regarding expected trial outcome is 
modified in each case based on the above-described factors.44 By 
adding these to the underlying theory, argues Bibas, a more complex 
and accurate picture of plea bargaining emerges. Importantly, this 
modification of the traditional shadow-of-trial theory actually 
expands the role of the defendant in influencing the plea bargaining 
machine, a position seemingly at odds with the administrative theory.  
Through an analysis of three recent terrorism prosecutions that 
resulted in guilty pleas, this article will demonstrate that both the 
administrative and shadow-of-trial theories of plea bargaining 
accurately reflect portions of the plea bargaining process. As such, a 
theory that combines these two models will present a more complete 
description of the internal operations of the plea bargaining machine, 
the roles played by its actors, and the factors at varying stages of the 
process that influence both whether a guilty plea is entered and what 
type of benefits are received in return.  
II.  SETTING THE STAGE—THREE ACTS OF TERROR 
A.  Richard Reid—A Bargain of One’s Own 
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, before the world 
could even digest the magnitude of the events that had unfolded on 
the East Coast of the United States, another al Qaeda plot was 
underway in Europe. The perpetrator of this attack was a young 
English man who had been in and out of trouble his entire life and 
whose only sense of purpose seemed to materialize after he embraced 
the hate inspired teachings of radical extremism.  
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 2467. 
 44. See id. at 2545 (“Trials affect pleas, but so do many other influences unrelated to the merits.”). 
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Born in England in 1973, Richard Reid left school at the age of 
sixteen to enter a life of street crime and car thievery similar to his 
father’s pursuits. Reid’s first arrest came in 1990 at the age of 
seventeen and represented merely the beginning of a revolving door 
that took him in and out of prison numerous times over the next few 
years.45   
In the mid-1990s, Reid reunited with his father, who had been 
absent for much of his childhood due to his own incarcerations, and 
was introduced by him to Islam. His father, who converted to Islam 
while in prison in the 1980s, believed his son could benefit from 
participating in the faith.46 Though Reid did not immediately embrace 
the suggestion, he did decide to convert the next time he was 
incarcerated.  
After being released from prison in 1994, Reid joined the Brixton 
Mosque and Islamic Cultural Center in London. Perhaps dissatisfied 
with the Brixton Mosque’s moderate tones, Reid quickly left for the 
notoriously radical Finsbury Park mosque in north London. The 
Finsbury Park mosque is known to have been frequented by Zacarias 
Moussaoui, who was convicted of complicity in the September 11, 
2001 attacks, and three individuals linked to the failed attempt to 
bomb the U.S. Embassy in Paris, France, in 2002.47 It was here that 
Reid was exposed to radical extremist philosophies and the 
promotion of jihad.  
By 1998, Reid had decided to join the al Qaeda movement, and in 
1999 he left England for Pakistan where he crossed the border into 
Afghanistan to attend terrorist training camps. After receiving 
training in Afghanistan, Reid returned to England in 2001 before 
beginning a journey that took him to Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Alan Cowell, Jailed Briton, The Shadowy Trail and Shift to Islam of a Bomb Suspect, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at A1; Elliott, supra note 1, at 48. 
 46. Elliott, supra note 1, at 48 (“Muslims, he says, ‘treat you like a human being.’ Plus, he says, they 
get better food in prison. Richard took his father’s advice. The next time he was incarcerated, he 
converted.”).  
 47. Id. (“Moussaoui was a regular at Finsbury Park, as were other al-Qaeda operatives, such as 
Djamel Beghal and probably Kamel Daoudi, two Frenchmen currently being held for their alleged role 
in a plot to blow up the American embassy in Paris. Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian former professional 
soccer player now being held in Belgium, who is alleged to have been the designated suicide bomber in 
the Paris-embassy plot, is also thought to have frequented the mosque.”). 
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During these travels, Reid scouted for potential terrorist targets 
before returning to Afghanistan to be debriefed and, presumably, 
assigned the mission that would lead him to become the notorious 
“shoe bomber.” According to authorities, after receiving his mission, 
Reid traveled to the Netherlands and Brussels before arriving in Paris 
in December 2001.48   
According to Parisian officials, Reid did not stay at a hotel during 
his time in the capital, thus implying that he was housed by fellow 
conspirators in the days preceding the attack. On December 21, 2001, 
Reid made his first attempt to board an American Airlines flight to 
Miami. Turned away because of his suspicious appearance and 
because he had no luggage or carry-on bags for the lengthy flight, 
Reid returned to Charles de Gaulle Airport on December 22, 2001, 
and successfully boarded American Airlines Flight 63.49   
Given Reid’s psychological condition at the time of his 
apprehension after American Airlines Flight 63 landed at Boston’s 
Logan Airport, it appeared unlikely that he would participate in any 
manner in the American criminal justice system. In fact, one would 
expect that an individual who was as committed as Reid to the ideals 
of the al Qaeda network might even attempt to utilize a criminal trial 
as a forum to condemn the institutions and organizations against 
which he was fighting.50 Yet, on October 3, 2002, Reid filed a motion 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. at 49 (“By the summer of 2001, Reid was back in London. In July he obtained a new British 
passport in Amsterdam, claiming that he had accidentally put his old one through a washing machine, 
and flew to Israel on an El Al Flight. Once in Israel, according to security sources there, Reid spent most 
of his time in Tel Aviv, where he cased the mall and office complex called the Azrieli Center as well as 
the local bus and train stations . . . . After 10 days in Israel, Reid crossed into Egypt and from there flew 
to Turkey and back to Pakistan before being debriefed . . . in Afghanistan.”); see also Cowell, supra 
note 45, at A1 (“Since his arrest there have been increasing indications that Richard Reid’s travels in the 
last three years—to Pakistan, Cairo and the Gaza Strip—had dark purposes as well.”).  
 49. This was not the first time Reid was detained for questioning before boarding a flight. In July 
2001, Reid was detained by Israeli officials before boarding an El Al flight to Israel because of 
suspicious behavior. See Cowell, supra note 45, at B3. 
 50. In 2006, Zacarias Moussaoui testified at his trial related to the attacks on September 11, 2001, 
and boasted of his involvement in the plot and his approval of the event:   
[W]hen he began his long-awaited testimony on Monday, he offered a lengthy 
description of a far deeper involvement with Al Qaeda and its plots. Not only was he a 
member of the terror network, he told the jury, he also said that he knew most of the Sept. 
11 hijackers, admitted that he lied to investigators about his knowledge of their plot when 
he was arrested on immigration violations three weeks before the attacks on New York 
 
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:2 
 
256 
stating his intent to plead guilty to all charges.51 The motion also 
requested that the court remove any reference in the indictment to his 
having attended an al Qaeda training camp. Unlike most guilty pleas, 
there was no plea bargain with the government, but, rather, Reid 
decided to plead guilty without the promise of any leniency from the 
prosecution. It is important to note that Reid was offered the 
opportunity to negotiate with the prosecution for a more lenient 
sentence. Reid, however, declined to cooperate, and the government 
had made it clear from the beginning that any negotiation would 
require an agreement that he provide information regarding his 
involvement with al Qaeda.52 
Although Reid did not seek leniency from the government, there 
was a strong incentive for him to plead guilty. He sought to avoid the 
publicity associated with a trial. Reid’s defense attorney stated, 
“[Reid] has no disagreement with the facts asserted in the charges as 
to his actions on December 22, 2001, and wants to avoid the publicity 
associated with a trial and the negative impact it is likely to have 
upon his family.”53 This same desire to avoid further psychological 
costs for his family was also the impetus behind his request that any 
reference to al Qaeda be removed from his indictment. For Reid, the 
memory of a lone assailant would be less harmful to his family than 
the image of a radical terrorist working for the same group that had 
conducted the September 11, 2001 attacks.54  
                                                                                                                 
and the Pentagon, and recounted that he was ecstatic when, behind bars, he heard the 
news of the attacks on a radio he had bought for that purpose. 
Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui, Undermining Case, Now Ties Himself to 9/11 Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 
2006, at A1.  
 51. Pam Belluck, Threats and Responses: The Shoe-Bomb Suspect; Man Accused of Shoe-Bomb Plot 
Says He Intends to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2002, at A1.  
 52. See id. at A17 (“Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a statement saying: ‘Richard Reid, like 
any defendant, is free to plead guilty to criminal charges. The Justice Department has not entered into 
any plea agreement with Reid.’ The source close to the defense said that the government made it ‘pretty 
clear from the beginning that if Mr. Reid was not willing to cooperate they weren’t going to give him 
anything.’”). 
 53. Id. at A17. 
 54. Recently, Najibullah Zazi became yet another high profile terror suspect to plead guilty. In a 
manner similar to Richard Reid, Zazi pleaded guilty, “in part out of concern that a widening inquiry 
would result in more charges against his family members, including his mother.” A.G. Sulzberger & 
William K. Rashbaum, Guilty Plea Made in Plot to Bomb New York Subway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
2010, at A23.   
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On December 22, 2002, following his plea of guilty, Reid was 
sentenced to life in prison. At his sentencing, despite his prior efforts 
to distance himself from al Qaeda for the benefit of his family, Reid 
informed the judge that he was, in fact, a member of the terrorist 
organization. In concluding his remarks, Reid pledged his support 
once more for Osama bin Laden and declared himself to be an enemy 
of the United States.55 It is likely that these statements resulted from 
the court’s refusal to remove the references to al Qaeda in the 
indictment, and, therefore, Reid realized he and his family would be 
subjected to the stigma of the association despite his initial efforts to 
the contrary.  
The Reid case demonstrates a vital aspect of the plea bargaining 
machine that has to date been neglected in the scholarship. In every 
case where the defendant pleads guilty, the defendant receives 
inherent institutional benefits in return, regardless of whether the 
defendant also receives additional benefits from the prosecution. This 
aspect of the system will be termed unilateral plea bargaining because 
the defendant is trading the right to trial in return for certain benefits 
offered by the system itself and not by the government.  
In cases where the defendant has entered into a bilateral plea 
bargain with the government, the additional institutional benefits are 
another incentive to plead guilty. In cases where the defendant will 
not or cannot engage in bilateral negotiations, such as the Reid case, 
the defendant may plead guilty merely for these institutional benefits. 
It should be noted that defendants, such as Reid, who plead guilty 
merely for the institutional benefits are typically those defendants 
against whom the government’s case is the strongest. This is true for 
two reasons. First, where the defendant’s case is strong, it is unlikely 
that the smaller benefits associated with a unilateral plea bargain will 
create a sufficient incentive for the defendant to forego the possibility 
of acquittal at trial. Second, and by the same token, if the 
government’s case is weak, the prosecution will likely offer some 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Man Charged as Accomplice in “Shoe” Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A37. Several years 
later, Saajid Badat, also from England, pleaded guilty to plotting to bomb an airliner bound for the 
United States as part of a conspiracy with Richard Reid. Lizette Alvarez, Briton, in Shift, Pleads Guilty 
in Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2005, at A8.  
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additional benefits to encourage a bargain. Unilateral plea bargaining 
is a vital, yet ignored aspect of the criminal justice system and should 
be included in any model of plea bargaining as it is present in every 
criminal case resulting in a plea of guilty.56 
Where a defendant is considering the inherent institutional benefits 
of pleading guilty, there are a variety of factors that might motivate 
the individual to do so. These might include, among others, the 
possibility of a reduction in the applicable sentence due to the 
acceptance of responsibility credit found at section 3E1.1 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines; an increased likelihood that the 
court will entertain a request for assignment to a specific prison for 
geographical and health related reasons; or the avoidance of the 
financial and psychological burdens of a trial on both defendants and 
their families.57 In the case of Reid, the benefit he sought from the 
system was the opportunity for his family to avoid further 
associational stigma by requesting the court remove reference to al 
Qaeda in his indictment and by avoiding the negative publicity he 
and his family would suffer during a lengthy and well-publicized 
trial.58 While offers of leniency in return for cooperation were of no 
interest to Reid, the opportunity to spare his family the societal costs 
associated with a trial were incentive enough for him to bypass a trial 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Dervan, supra note 8, at 478 (describing plea bargaining as a system in which “rights are 
exchanged for concessions”); see also Alschuler, supra note 16; Jeff Palmer, Abolishing Plea 
Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 508–11 (1999); Scott & 
Stuntz, supra note 37, at 1912. 
 57. As an example, under section 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who 
“clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense” may receive a decrease in the 
applicable offense level by two levels and, if the original offense level is sixteen or greater, may also 
receive an additional one level reduction. In the notes section of the chapter, it states, “This adjustment 
is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying 
the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.” 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2007).  
 58. Mary A. Farkas & Gale Miller, Reentry and Reintegration: Challenges Faced by the Families of 
Convicted Sex Offenders, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 88, 90 (2007) (“A ‘courtesy stigma’ is attached to 
families, which results in their social marginalization, even though they did not commit a sex offense. 
For many family members, their identities as spouses, parents, siblings, and children are suspended 
while they try to negotiate their daily lives.”). See generally SOCIAL WORK AND DISADVANTAGE: 
ADDRESSING THE ROOTS OF STIGMA THROUGH ASSOCIATION (Peter Burke & Jonathan Parker eds., 
2007) (discussing stigma by association). 
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and acquiesce to the criminal justice system’s desire for his 
imprisonment.   
The Reid case, therefore, demonstrates that in attempting to 
understand the plea bargaining machine, one must acknowledge that 
the prosecution is not always in control of the process and, at times, 
may not even participate. Plea bargains in which defendants trade 
benefits with the system itself are an important aspect of the machine 
and must not be discounted when constructing plea bargaining 
theory. Furthermore, one gains a greater understanding of the 
diversity of factors influencing whether a plea of guilty will be 
entered if one realizes that defendants sometimes bargain for benefits 
other than sentencing reductions and sometimes seek benefits that are 
available from sources other than the prosecution, such as the court or 
the criminal justice process itself.  
B.  Lodi, California—A Pre-Emptive Strike 
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation revised their missions 
with regard to terrorism prosecutions. Traditionally, the agencies had 
structured and executed criminal investigations with the purpose of 
securing convictions for the most readily provable offenses. At times, 
this approach meant investigations would linger for years as evidence 
was compiled and the strongest case possible was obtained. In 
response to the attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and the District 
of Columbia, the government quickly realized that this strategy could 
not persist, and prevention, even at the expense of prosecutions, 
would become the driving priority for terrorism related 
investigations.59  
                                                                                                                 
 59. See Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2006, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/prophetic-justice/5234/1/ (“The September 11, 
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon prompted a fundamental shift in the 
American government’s approach to Islamic terrorism. Before 9/11, the government largely responded 
to attacks that had already occurred—by launching cruise missiles at terrorist bases in Afghanistan and 
Sudan after the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, for example, or by prosecuting the planners and 
perpetrators of those bombings in federal court. . . .  But after 9/11, the focus turned to prevention.”). 
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Bob Woodward recounts the implementations of the new 
prevention model of law enforcement after 9/11 in his account of the 
government’s response to the attacks. According to Woodward, at a 
meeting of the National Security Council, during which FBI director 
Robert Mueller stated that care needed to be exercised to ensure 
evidence was not tainted during subsequent arrests and prosecutions, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft interrupted the conversation and 
stated, “Let’s stop the discussion right here . . . . The chief mission of 
U.S. law enforcement . . . is to stop another attack and apprehend any 
accomplices or terrorists before they hit us again. If we can’t bring 
them to trial, so be it.”60 
In a white paper on counterterrorism in 2006, the Department of 
Justice elaborated on the specific manner in which the agency’s 
mission changed in 2001:  
The events of September 11 transformed the mission of the 
Department of Justice. The Department revised its Strategic Plan 
to emphasize the prevention and disruption of terrorism. Indeed, 
the protection of our national security and the prevention of 
terrorist acts are our number one goal. On every level, we are 
now committed to a new strategy of prevention. This includes 
the design, implementation and support of policies and strategies, 
including the investigation and prosecution of terrorism and 
terrorism-related cases and the pursuit of legislative initiatives, 
which will prevent, disrupt and defeat domestic and international 
terrorist operations before they occur.61  
In conformity with this new Department of Justice strategy, termed 
preemptive prosecution, the FBI was informed that its field offices 
would no longer be permitted to set priorities, and instead, there was 
one national priority—prevention.62    
                                                                                                                 
 60. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 42 (2002).   
 61. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 5 (2006). 
 62. Kelly Moore, The Role of Federal Criminal Prosecutions in the War on Terrorism, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 837, 838–39 (2007) (“In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, the 
government made a dramatic shift in its approach to terrorism prosecutions. The new philosophy called 
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It was in this climate of prevention and intervention that a much 
different terrorism investigation and prosecution than that of Richard 
Reid unfolded against several men from Lodi, California, a 
community which is located approximately forty miles south of 
Sacramento and which has had a large Pakistani community since the 
early 1900s.  
On May 29, 2005, at 5:30 a.m., the FBI field office in Sacramento 
received information from FBI headquarters that an individual on the 
government’s “No Fly” list was traveling from Pakistan to San 
Francisco. The individual was Hamid Hayat, a twenty-three year old 
with little direction in his life who drifted between Lodi and his 
family’s home country of Pakistan.63 In response to this information, 
the plane was diverted to Japan where FBI agents on the ground 
interviewed Hayat and then eventually released him to complete his 
journey home.  
Despite being convinced that Hayat posed no immediate threat, the 
FBI was uncertain of Hayat’s long-term intentions upon his arrival 
back in the United States. Therefore, on June 4, 2005, FBI agents 
interviewed Hayat again. During this interrogation, Hayat was 
specifically asked if he had attended any terrorist training camps, to 
which he responded that he would never be involved in such 
extremism. Perhaps in an effort to convince authorities of the truth of 
his statements, Hayat agreed to a request that he return the next day 
with his father to take a polygraph test. It was upon completing this 
polygraph test that the case suddenly took a new direction.  
According to the FBI, after failing portions of the polygraph test, 
Hayat admitted to attending terrorist training camps during visits to 
Pakistan and receiving training in weapons, explosives, hand-to-hand 
combat, and other paramilitary exercises. When Hayat’s father was 
asked whether his son attended any terrorist training camps, he told 
the FBI agents there were no such camps in Pakistan. After being 
                                                                                                                 
for using every available federal criminal statute to pursue people that existing intelligence suggested 
might be involved in supporting or participating in terrorist organizations and acts of terrorism. The new 
goal was to detect, prevent, disrupt, and deter terrorism.”). 
 63. Greg Krikorian & Rone Tempest, 2 Men Held in Links to Terror, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at 
B1.  
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informed of his son’s confession, however, the elder Hayat allegedly 
admitted that his son had attended terrorist camps and that he had 
provided him with $100 a month allowance during these trips. He 
also informed the agents that he himself had witnessed weapons 
training at such camps.  
Though at the time of their interrogations neither had engaged in 
direct acts of terrorism, the Department of Justice’s new preventative 
strategy clearly called for the arrests of both men on whatever 
charges might be available simply to get them off the street. As a 
result, the government detained the younger Hayat on two charges of 
lying to agents about his attending terrorist training camps and 
receiving weapons training and detained the elder Hayat on a single 
charge of lying to agents about his knowledge of his son’s activities 
in Pakistan.64 
The defense attorney for the elder Hayat immediately recognized 
that the Department of Justice’s strategy of preventive prosecution 
had limited the government’s ability to bring more severe charges 
against the two men. In commenting on the lack of more significant 
charges, he stated, “We don’t see any of that here. If the government 
can prove they attended a camp and therefore are terrorists, then why 
didn’t they charge them with that?”65 While it is true that the 
government had very little to work with during the opening hours of 
the investigation, they were able to gather sufficient evidence to add a 
much more significant charge against the son prior to trial—the 
charge of materially supporting a terrorist network.  
Following September 11, 2001, the government did not seek new 
laws to utilize in the preemptive prosecution model. Rather, the 
government relied on 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, a law that was initially 
passed in the 1990s and that barred “material support” of terrorism.66 
The statute makes it unlawful to “knowingly provide[] material 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Eric Bailey, Lodi Men Accused of Lying to FBI, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at B1.   
 65. Id.   
 66. See Brian P. Comerford, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting Material Support, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2005).   
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support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”67 The term 
“material support or resources” is defined as follows:  
[C]urrency or monetary instruments or financial securities, 
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel . . . and transportation, except 
medicine or religious materials . . . .68 
As applied to situations such as the Lodi case, the material support 
statute allowed for prosecution of an individual who had not executed 
a terrorist attack but who had been linked to a terrorist organization 
and whom the government believed was a future threat. While the 
material support charge for Hayat was less than many expected for an 
individual the government had labeled an al Qaeda sleeper agent, 
these charges represented the best means of moving forward with a 
significant preemptive prosecution where little evidence of an actual 
planned terrorist strike existed.69 Responding to these concerns, U.S. 
Attorney McGregor Scott stated, “We have detected, we have 
disrupted and we have deterred, . . . and whatever was taking shape in 
Lodi isn’t going to happen now.”70 The government, therefore, was 
satisfied that it had fulfilled its obligation to intervene early even if it 
resulted in a riskier and less severe prosecution.  
Based on the limited evidence that had been gathered, the 
prosecution moved forward to trial in February 2006. The case lasted 
                                                                                                                 
 67. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). 
 68. Id. § 2339A(b). The definition of material support was expanded after September 11, 2001, to 
include “expert advice or assistance.” This addition and the material support law itself have been 
challenged in court proceedings since 9/11, but the issue of the statute’s constitutionality is not within 
the focus of this article. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 382, 405 (9th Cir. 
2003); see also Comerford, supra note 66, at 724–25 (discussing the challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B). 
For a discussion of terrorism laws generally, see Nora V. Demleitner, How Many Terrorists Are There? 
The Escalation in So-Called Terrorism Prosecutions, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 38 (2003).   
 69. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of 
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2005) (“[P]rosecutors have creatively interpreted existing laws 
banning the provision of assets and other forms of support to terrorist organizations and individuals in 
order to make it a crime to be an active member of or to receive training from such groups.”). 
 70. Rone Tempest, Lodi Man Indicted in Alleged Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005 at B3.    
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several weeks and painted two vastly different pictures of the Hayats. 
While the defense argued that the confessions had been forced, the 
prosecution contended that the Hayats were part of a global war. In 
particular, the prosecution argued that the son was a man “with a 
jihadi heart and a jihadi mind.”71 To support these assertions, the 
government relied on evidence such as a note carried by the son in 
his wallet that read, “Oh Allah, we place you at their throats, and we 
seek refuge in you from their evil.”72 Furthermore, the government 
freely acknowledged to the jury that it had acted early and this 
decision prevented them from gathering all the evidence they would 
typically procure before indicting a defendant. One of the prosecutors 
told the jury, “This is not a case where a building has been blown up, 
and you know, the forensic investigators go in, they go looking 
through the rubble looking for clues . . . . This isn’t that kind of case. 
This is a charge that allows the FBI to prevent acts of violence like 
that.”73 He concluded by asking whether Americans would want 
anything less.74 
After significant deliberations, the jury deadlocked on the guilt of 
the elder Hayat, and U.S. District Judge Garland E. Burrell declared a 
mistrial. The jury, however, returned a verdict of guilty for the son, 
and he was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison. In reporting on 
the split outcome, the media focused, as the prosecution had in its 
own case, on the difficulty associated with proving guilt at trial while 
implementing the new preemptive prosecution strategy. In 
summarizing the dilemma, one reporter wrote, “Its supporters say it is 
an important tool to head off threats. Critics say it allows the 
government to subject people to lengthy prison terms based on little 
evidence that they intended to hurt anyone.”75 The government’s 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Rone Tempest, Lodi Terror Case Goes to the Jury, LA TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at B3. 
 72. Waldman, supra note 59. See generally Tempest, supra note 71. 
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gamble of prosecuting the Hayats based on what little evidence could 
be gathered resulted in a split verdict, but the government quickly 
came back and announced they would retry the elder Hayat. Despite 
taking this strong stand following defeat, both the prosecution and the 
defense were ready to utilize the plea bargaining machine.  
For the prosecution, the specter of another lengthy and expensive 
trial that might result in a hung jury or an acquittal was not appealing. 
Hayat also had reason to negotiate as he had already spent a year in 
jail and risked the possibility of less success with a second jury. As in 
the Reid case, Hayat was also concerned about the stigma of a 
terrorism conviction and alerted the prosecution early in the process 
that he would not plead guilty to any terrorism charges.76 Eventually, 
the two sides reached an agreement, and, on May 31, 2006, Hayat 
pleaded guilty to a customs violation in exchange for a sentence of 
time served. In explaining the government’s decision to enter into an 
agreement with an individual it had claimed was part of a global 
jihad, the U.S. Attorney stated, “This outcome, of course, was not the 
one most desired by the government . . . [but i]t was my decision that 
the felony plea we announce here today was the best resolution of 
this matter for the government.”77 Relying once again on the 
preemptive prosecution strategy to justify the case’s resolution, he 
concluded by stating, “Our region is much safer today than it was one 
year ago.”78 
For purposes of furthering our understanding of the plea 
bargaining machine, the first important element of the Hayat case is 
that, unlike the Reid prosecution, it involved bilateral plea 
negotiations that resulted in an agreement beneficial to both parties. 
That the government offered incentives for this plea, however, does 
not mean that the defendant did not also consider and receive the 
inherent institutional benefits of pleading guilty. For instance, as with 
                                                                                                                 
anyone. In effect, ‘you prosecute people not for what they have done but for what you fear they might 
do in the future,’ said David Cole, a Georgetown University law professor.”). 
 76. See Rone Tempest & Eric Bailey, Lodi Man Is Released in Plea Bargain, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
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the Reid case, Hayat’s guilty plea enabled him and his family to 
avoid the stigma, financial and psychological burdens, and other 
hardships of a second trial. Furthermore, Hayat benefited from the 
certainty of the plea bargaining process, whereas a second trial on the 
full spectrum of charges meant risking conviction and a lengthy 
prison sentence.  
Second, in contrast to the administrative theory’s portrait of an 
unwilling defendant forced to accept the government’s determination 
of both charges and sentence, Hayat provides an example of an active 
defendant engaged in the plea bargaining process.79 First, Hayat 
made clear his intent to bargain with the prosecution, thus identifying 
from whom he sought additional incentives beyond the institutional 
benefits available for pleading guilty. Second, Hayat identified the 
specific incentives that would encourage him to plead guilty. This is a 
vital role for the defendant in the plea bargaining system, because it 
alerts the prosecution to factors important to the specific defendant, 
therefore increasing the likelihood of a successful plea offer. Here, 
Hayat alerted the government that he would only accept a plea 
bargain that did not result in a “terrorism” conviction. Not willing to 
accept the risks of a complete acquittal for Hayat in the second trial, 
the government focused on this factor and utilized it to create an offer 
that was sufficient to result in a plea bargain. Although such a 
significant benefit might not be offered in all cases, the challenges 
associated with the government’s preemptive prosecution strategy in 
terrorism cases meant that Hayat was in a position to assert pressure 
on the government for this concession. Finally, after influencing the 
plea bargaining machine in a manner that resulted in his receiving the 
types and quality of benefits desired, Hayat accepted the bargain.  
Third, while the modified shadow-of-trial theory appears to more 
accurately describe the posturing and negotiating that occurs in the 
preliminary phase of the bilateral plea bargaining process, the 
administrative theory is correct that prosecutors control much of the 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Gifford, supra note 25; Johnson, supra note 35, at 779; Klein, supra note 30; Langbein, supra 
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decision-making regarding the ultimate charges and sentence that will 
result.80 In the Hayat case, the defendant exerted significant influence 
over the prosecution’s evaluation of the case through engaging them 
in negotiations and identifying the type of benefits sought. The 
government then utilized this information and reached a decision 
regarding an acceptable plea offer. There is little doubt that if Hayat 
had refused to accept the government’s offer, he would have been 
prosecuted on the original charges at a second trial. This did not 
occur, however, because the government, in making its 
administrative determination regarding the appropriate charge and 
sentence for the plea agreement, appears to have properly considered 
both the risks of trial, the barriers to a successful plea deal, and the 
benefits sought by the defendant when constructing its offer. If this 
had not been so, Hayat would likely have gone to trial again. While 
the administrative phase of the bilateral plea negotiations process 
does result in the government forcing its final determination on the 
defendant, when examined in conjunction with the first phase of the 
process it appears less nefarious. Instead, the administrative 
determination appears more a reflection of the specific case and the 
benefits important to each side in reaching a resolution. Although not 
every offer will contain all of the benefits sought by each party, a 
successful plea offer must contain sufficient incentives for the 
defendant to accept, and, as demonstrated by Hayat’s refusal to plead 
guilty to a terrorism charge, these incentives must be tailored to the 
specific defendant and, in many cases, include more than a mere 
reduction in sentence.  
C.  Lackawanna Six—Battling an Unknown Mission 
Lackawanna, New York, is an old steel town south of Buffalo with 
a large Yemeni-American neighborhood of over 3,000 people. 
Families from Yemen began moving to the area forty to fifty years 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–66; Church, supra note 37, at 512–14, 523; 
Easterbrook, Bargaining as Compromise, supra note 37, at 1975; Easterbrook, Market System, supra 
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ago, and today they have established a strong neighborhood, which 
they consider to be “one big family.”81 In 1998, however, a former 
member of the community reappeared and forever changed the 
history of this neighborhood.  
Kamal Derwish moved to Lackawanna in 1998 and almost 
immediately began speaking at the local mosque about his beliefs.82 
For the most part, his early activities seemed like legitimate 
community building as he spoke of keeping kids off the street and 
away from drugs. Over time, however, he began taking more 
extremist positions and eventually convinced seven young men to 
travel to Afghanistan to attend al Qaeda training camps. 
Unbeknownst to the small Lackawanna community at the time, 
Derwish was an al Qaeda recruiter sent to New York to convince as 
many individuals as he could to join his cause.83  
As the seven Lackawanna men set off for Afghanistan in the spring 
of 2001, they devised a story to cover their tracks. They told their 
friends and family they were traveling to Pakistan to study with an 
Islamic evangelical group. According to one of the seven, “It was 
adventure . . . . You’re going to learn how to use weapons. That part 
of it was like the exciting part. You’re going to be able to shoot, you 
know, and this and that.”84 After arriving in Pakistan, the group 
traveled into Afghanistan where they were greeted by Osama bin 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Brian P. Comerford, supra note 66, at 726–32; Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Where the 
Trail Led: Between Evidence and Suspicion; Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at A1; Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of 
Military Detention, BYU L. REV. 1255, 1270 (2006); see also Chesney, supra note 69, at 39–45 
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 82. According to the FBI, Derwish was born in Lackawanna in 1973, but his family moved to Saudi 
Arabia. In the 1990s, he attended an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan and fought in Bosnia. He 
returned to Saudi Arabia in 1997 and was imprisoned for extremist activities. In 1998, he moved back to 
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 83. Id. (describing an FBI memorandum regarding al Qaeda recruiters, “‘After a mosque is chosen,’ 
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 84. Id. 
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Laden. At this point, several of the group realized they had made a 
terrible mistake, and as a result, four of the men left the six-week 
training camp early.85  
At the same time the men were in Afghanistan, an unsigned, 
handwritten letter arrived at the FBI field office in Buffalo, New 
York. The note stated that eight men from Lackawanna had traveled 
to an al Qaeda training camp.86 Shortly thereafter, the FBI contacted 
one of the men, Sahim Alwan, who, having left the training camp 
early, was already back in New York. Alwan met with an agent, but 
merely related the agreed upon cover story regarding religious study 
in Pakistan. There was no evidence of a crime, and, having been 
presented with a plausible explanation for Alwan’s travels, the FBI 
moved on to other matters. After September 11, 2001, however, the 
government’s focus returned to Lackawanna.  
As was discussed with regard to the Lodi investigation, the 
Department of Justice’s and FBI’s missions changed drastically 
following the September 11, 2001, attacks.87 FBI Director Robert 
Mueller stated, “Our overriding priority right now is prevention.”88 In 
conformity with this strategy, FBI officials in Buffalo, New York, 
stated of the Lackawanna men, “If we don’t know for sure they’re 
going to do something, or not, we need to make sure that we prevent 
anything they may be planning, whether or not we know or don’t 
know about it.”89 As such, the FBI made the Lackawanna group a top 
national priority, despite the lack of evidence or information 
regarding plans for any future attacks. At the height of the 
investigation, the FBI was producing field reports on the situation 
twice a day, and the President received daily briefings on the 
matter.90  
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Purdy & Bergman, supra note 81. (“From Sept. 11 on, the driving goal of the government was to 
find the next sleeper cell before it struck.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. (“Headquarters ordered written updates twice a day, at 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. Mr. Mueller was 
briefed twice daily, the officials said, and he often made Lackawanna part of his daily briefing to 
President Bush. Stanley Borgia, then second in command in the Buffalo F.B.I., said, ‘I would look at my 
watch and say, 8:30. The president is saying to the directors, ‘What’s going on in Buffalo?’”). 
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:2 
 
270 
Throughout this stage of the investigation, however, the 
Lackawanna men remained consistent regarding their cover story, 
and little in the way of new evidence materialized. Then, in the 
summer of 2002, events unfolded that forced the government to 
respond, despite the lack of evidence of any crime. By this time, two 
of the seven Lackawanna recruits were outside the United States. One 
had moved to Yemen and another, Mukhtar al-Bakri, was traveling in 
the Middle East in preparations for his wedding in Bahrain. During 
this trip, al-Bakri emailed back to the United States a message that 
read, “The next meal will be very huge. No one will be able to 
withstand it except those with faith.”91 For the intelligence 
community, the term “meal” was synonymous with attack, and the 
FBI was left with the choice of piecing together a preemptive 
prosecution or waiting for further evidence at the risk of allowing a 
terrorist attack to go unstopped: 
Once the C.I.A. gave Lackawanna the “most dangerous” label 
. . . the administration asked, “Can you guarantee to me that 
these people won’t do something?” Mr. Watson [the FBI’s 
counterterrorism chief at the time] said. 
“And the answer,” he said, “is we think we can. We are probably 
99 percent sure that we can make sure that these guys don’t do 
something—if they are planning to do something. And under the 
rules that we were playing under at the time, that’s not 
acceptable. So a conscious decision was made, ‘Let’s get ‘em out 
of here.’”92 
As one official noted of the decision, “What do we do if we believe 
they’re going to do something, and we have nothing to pull them off 
the street with?”93 
The government determined that the answer was to find one 
member of the Lackawanna group who would turn on the others and 
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provide the evidence necessary to bring charges of material support 
of a terrorist organization. Just as in the Lodi case, the government 
had no direct evidence of a terrorist plot but could creatively use the 
material support statutes to bring charges related to the men’s 
attendance at al Qaeda training camps. This, the government 
contended, would be a means of stopping any future plans for which 
the men might be preparing. As such, in the middle of the night, 
Bahraini police burst into the hotel room of newly married al-Bakri, 
the sender of the “meal” email, and arrested him.94 On September 11, 
2002, on the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, FBI agents traveled 
to Bahrain to interrogate al-Bakri. He admitted almost immediately 
that he and the other five men still in Lackawanna had traveled to 
Afghanistan to attend a training camp. A short while later in 
Lackawanna, the FBI approached Alwan with details from the 
interrogation of al-Bakri. Realizing the charade was over, he too 
confessed to the actual events. The arrests of the remaining four men 
in Lackawanna followed shortly thereafter. In announcing the arrests, 
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson stated, “United States law 
enforcement . . . has identified, investigated and disrupted [an al] 
Qaeda-trained terrorist cell on American soil.”95 
The six defendants faced a two-count indictment on charges of 
providing material support to a terrorist organization.96 The first 
charge, providing material support, carried a maximum ten-year 
sentence, while the second charge, conspiracy, carried a maximum 
fifteen-year sentence. Under these charges, each defendant faced a 
possible twenty-five year sentence. The six pleaded guilty in quick 
succession, each determining that the benefits of a guilty plea 
outweighed the risks associated with proceeding to trial. In return for 
the pleas, the government dropped the conspiracy charges, and each 
man received a sentence between seven and ten years depending on 
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his conduct and cooperation, a significant reduction from the 
potential twenty-five year sentence they faced at trial.  
Faysal Galab was the first to plead guilty, and he received the most 
lenient prison term of all the men in return—seven years.97 Shafal 
Mosed pleaded guilty and apologized to the court for his actions. 
According to Mosed’s attorney, the government threatened to declare 
him an enemy combatant if he refused to cooperate.98 The 
government argued for a lighter sentence because Mosed assisted law 
enforcement and left the training camp early.99 He received eight 
years in prison, as did Yasein Taher who also cooperated.100 Sahim 
Alwan pleaded guilty and received nine and a half years in prison.101 
Yahya Goba pleaded guilty in return for a recommended sentence of 
eight years, although the court sentenced him to ten years in prison. 
According to his attorney, Goba pleaded guilty, in part, because of 
family considerations and the possibility that the government would 
charge him with a more serious crime.102 Mukhtar al-Bakri was the 
last of the six men to plead guilty, and he received a sentence of ten 
years.103 According to his attorney, he pleaded guilty out of fear that 
the government would file additional charges.104  
In summarizing the government’s efforts to respond to the 
Lackawanna Six, the FBI agent first assigned to investigate the 
mysterious anonymous letter informing the government of a potential 
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terrorist cell summarized the case by stating, “We were looking to 
prevent something. And we did. Obviously nothing happened. So we 
all did our job.”105 
First, as with the Hayat plea negotiation, the Lackawanna Six 
engaged in bilateral negotiations with the government. Once again, 
however, the institutional benefits of pleading guilty were a factor in 
the success of the plea bargaining machine. Yahya Goba pleaded 
guilty in return for a recommended sentence of eight years, in part, 
because of family considerations.106 Just as Richard Reid pleaded 
guilty solely for the institutional benefit of sparing his family the 
difficulty of a terrorism trial, so too was at least one of the 
Lackawanna Six motivated by considerations of stigma and other 
trial related costs.107  
Second, once again the role of the defendant in the initial phase of 
the plea bargaining process contrasts with that portrayed by the 
administrative theory of plea bargaining.108 As in the Hayat matter, 
the government’s case was weakened by the preemptive prosecution 
model of law enforcement adopted for terrorism investigations after 
9/11. As such, the government was forced to utilize “material 
support” statutes that were not intended to serve as a mechanism for 
removing terrorist cells from the streets. Due to the resulting lack of 
direct evidence and the tenuously applied charges, a significant risk 
of acquittal for at least some of the men existed if bargains were not 
reached prior to trial. Seizing this opportunity, the defendants 
engaged the government and sought specific benefits in return. Here, 
except as noted above, the defendants appear to have been most 
interested in reductions in sentence in return for their guilty pleas. 
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This is an important aspect of these negotiations as compared with 
the Hayat matter, in which the defendant also sought to reduce the 
stigma associated with the prosecution through rejection of any 
terrorism related charges. Furthermore, as in the Hayat matter, the 
defendants played the ultimate role of accepting the government’s 
offers.  
Finally, the second phase of bilateral plea bargaining is again 
demonstrated by the defendants’ acceptance of the government’s 
administrative determination of the appropriate charge and sentence, 
because each determination was based on the government’s analysis 
of the likelihood of success at trial, the barriers to a successful plea 
bargain, and the benefits sought. Once again, while the shadow-of-
trial theory appears to more accurately describe the posturing and 
negotiating that occurs in the preliminary phase of the bilateral plea 
bargaining process, the administrative theory more aptly describes 
the process by which the government makes its actual plea offer.109   
III.  THE DUAL CHAMBERS OF THE PLEA BARGAINING MACHINE 
Through examination of three terrorism prosecutions that resulted 
in guilty pleas, this article has demonstrated both that the concept of 
plea bargaining must be expanded to include unilateral and bilateral 
plea bargaining and that a combination of the administrative and 
modified shadow-of-trial theories provides a more accurate 
representation of the two phases of the bilateral plea bargaining 
process. In Section III, this article will seek to construct a theory that 
reflects these findings. This theory, which will be termed the benefit 
distribution theory, will expand our current understanding of both the 
breadth of the plea bargaining machine and the roles of the 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 37, at 31–32; Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–
66; Church, supra note 37, at 512–14, 523; Easterbrook, Market System, supra note 37, at 309–17; 
Easterbrook, Bargaining as Compromise, supra note 37, at 1975; Landes, supra note 37, at 66–69; 
Ruttenburg, supra note 37, at 353; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 37, at 1935. 
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prosecution and the defense in the negotiation and decision-making 
process.110   
A.  Bilateral Plea Bargaining 
1.  Calculating the Outcome Differential 
Where the government and the defendant are both willing to 
consider bilateral plea negotiations, the process begins with each 
party evaluating the likelihood of success at trial as described in the 
traditional shadow-of-trial theory. The difference between the 
likelihood of conviction at trial and a guaranteed conviction at trial is 
the “outcome differential.”111 In its most simplistic terms, the 
outcome differential is reflective of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the prosecution’s and defense’s cases. As such, the weaker the 
government’s case is, the larger the outcome differential will be, and 
vice versa.112   
While the amount and force of evidence is a key consideration in 
determining the outcome differential, this calculation must account 
for all barriers to the prosecution’s or defense’s success at trial and, 
in many cases, includes a variety of considerations. It is here that 
many of the institutional barriers to success described by Stephanos 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Scholars have distinguished between “routine” plea bargaining cases, which are low-level 
offenses that rarely result in incarceration, and “adversarial” plea bargaining cases, where the 
seriousness of the offense and the significance of the potential punishment result in more structured 
bargaining. The terrorism cases described in this article certainly fall within the “adversarial” plea 
bargaining category. As such, the model of plea bargaining constructed herein is a highly sophisticated 
model tracking the complexities of such “adversarial” bargaining. Nevertheless, this model is equally 
applicable to “routine” plea bargaining cases, although certain steps in the model may be less 
pronounced due to the minimal risk of incarceration and the presence of unique considerations such as 
“going rates” for minimal offenses. O’Hear, supra note 31, at 415–16 (noting that field studies of plea 
bargaining have drawn a distinction between routine cases and more adversarial interactions). 
 111. See Figure 1. 
 112. See Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 788–89 (2008) (“[T]he vast majority of defendants enter plea bargains, which 
often agree upon sentences in the hopes that judges will rubber-stamp them. Even though these sentence 
bargains do not involve sentencing hearings or appeals, the parties bargain at least in part in the shadow 
of the likely sentence. When prosecutors hold all the aces at sentencing, they can drive hard bargains. 
Conversely, when their hands are weaker or less predictable, it is easier for defendants to bluff about 
insisting on a sentencing hearing and call prosecutors’ bluff.”); see also Alschuler, supra note 26, at 59 
(“A Chicago prosecutor says, ‘When we have a weak case for any reason, we’ll reduce to almost 
anything rather than lose.’”).  
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Bibas become important, such as poor lawyering.113 In the context of 
the terrorism prosecutions that this article has examined, the 
difficulties experienced by the government due to the policy of 
preemptive prosecution and the tenuous application of the material 
support statute are examples of barriers to success at trial. In a similar 
manner, the defendants’ likelihood of success at trial in the 
Lackawanna Six case was impacted by the confessions of two of the 
men prior to the arrests of the other men.114 As demonstrated by these 
two examples, the factors influencing the outcome of a case may be 
applicable to criminal prosecutions generally, a type of criminal 
offense such as terrorism, or be unique to a particular matter or 
defendant.115 The following model demonstrates the manner in which 
the size of the outcome differential shifts based on the barriers to 












                                                                                                                 
 113. Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–66. When considering the impact of poor 
lawyering, the strength of both the defense attorney and the government attorney are key considerations. 
See Ronald F. Wright, Guilty Pleas and Submarkets, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 68,  
71–72 (2008) (“Just as there are differences among defendants that matter when we evaluate plea 
negotiation practices, there are differences among prosecutors.”); Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. 
Brodsky, Characteristics of the Ideal Criminal Defense Attorney from the Client’s Perspective: 
Empirical Findings and Implications for Legal Practice, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 81 (2001) 
(discussing the importance of the defendant’s perception of his or her attorney).   
 114. See supra notes 95–104 and accompanying text.  
 115. See Covey, supra note 37, at 78–79 (“Where plea bargain prices are based primarily on expected 
trial outcomes, a defendant’s ability to negotiate a lenient plea bargain will largely depend on the 
strength of the evidence and the potential resource savings from a guilty plea. Prosecutors should be 
willing to “pay” greater discounts for guilty pleas where the evidence is weak or the resource costs of 
trial are greater relative to expected trial sentences.”). 






















During this first part of the initial assessment of the case, both the 
prosecution and the defense have the ability to influence the other’s 
perceptions by highlighting or emphasizing the strengths or 
weaknesses of the case and alerting the other to the manner in which 
the party will support its position or challenge the other’s 
assertions.116 For instance, in the Hayat matter, the defense alerted 
                                                                                                                 
 116. While the judiciary plays almost no role in plea bargaining in the federal system and in most 
state systems, there are a few notable exceptions. As Jenia I. Turner noted in her work on judicial 
participation in plea negotiations: 
In plea bargaining, as in many areas of the American criminal justice system, the role of 
the judge is essentially passive. In an adversarial system like ours, the parties initiate the 
case and direct its progress, including its possible disposition as a plea bargain. The 
judge’s role is limited to reviewing the bargain once it is presented. Many jurisdictions, 
including the federal, expressly prohibit judges from participating in or commenting on 
the plea negotiations. 
Turner, supra note 18, at 199; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“An attorney for the government and 
the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a plea 
agreement. The court must not participate in these discussions.”); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO 
PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.3(a) (Supp. 1968) (“The trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.”); 
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the government that, although the defense was willing to negotiate, it 
believed that there was a high likelihood that an attack of the 
preemptive nature of the prosecution would be successful in a second 
trial.117 By posturing in this manner, the defense influenced the 
government’s analysis of the case and, presumably, increased the 
assessed outcome differential. Examining the unique barriers to 
success at trial in the three terrorism cases described above, the below 
model creates an estimate of the applicable sizes of the outcome 












                                                                                                                 
959, 971–72 (2009) (noting courts’ reluctance to interfere in the plea bargaining process or thwart 
proposed bargains); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 29, 39 (2002) (“The clearest effect of plea bargains on trial judges is to marginalize them. Judges 
have little voice in traditional plea bargains.”). But see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); 
Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 678 (2009) 
(noting that in Brady, the trial court informed the defendant that he thought the defendant might get the 
death penalty, and, when the defendant indicated he would enter a plea of guilty, stated, “Well, I think 
you are very wise, because I was certainly going to submit the death penalty to the jury.”).   
As the judiciary plays almost no role during plea negotiations in the federal system and in 
many state systems, this article will not specifically incorporate the role of judges into the model. Where 
judges do engage in the plea bargaining process, however, the above model of plea bargaining is easily 
expanded to account for their influence at various stages of the negotiation. For instance, where a judge 
indicates to a defendant during a preliminary hearing that it would be in his or her best interest to plead 
guilty, this would impact both the defendant’s and the prosecution’s assessment of the case and, 
therefore, the applicable outcome differential. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The 
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33 n.11 (2002) (noting that an interesting feature 
of the New Orleans criminal justice system is the involvement of judges in plea bargaining, including 
sometimes negotiating with defendants; an involvement the authors note may be a trend around the 
country).  
 117. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Figure 2. 




















2.  To Negotiate a Plea or Not 
Once each party has conducted its evaluation of the outcome 
differential, each must determine whether the case is one in which 
they will either offer or entertain a plea offer. In most prosecutions, 
the outcome differential is significant enough to encourage the 
government to offer some benefits to the defendant, even if fairly de 
minimis, to create an incentive to plead guilty.119 This is due in part to 
the reality that plea deals necessarily permit the government to 
preserve resources that may then be utilized in other cases. For 
instance, even in the Reid case, in which the outcome differential was 
almost non-existent, the government offered the possibility of a 
bargain in return for information and cooperation.120 By the same 
token, the outcome differential is typically not so large as to convince 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See Figure 3. 
 120. While there are very few instances in which the government would make no plea offer to the 
defense, this possibility must be accounted for in the outcome differential theory. An example of a 
situation in which the government might not deal is where the case is highly publicized and the 
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a defendant not to entertain an offer from the government, as cases in 
which the outcome differential is this large would likely never be 
brought by the government or result in an indictment from a grand 
jury.121 As this article has described, over 95% of federal 
prosecutions result in a plea of guilty. Therefore, in most cases the 
parties’ assessments of the outcome differential results in a decision 
to engage in bargaining. Below is a model of the manner in which the 
size of the outcome differential affects the likelihood that the 
government will offer the defendant a bargain and that such offer will 




















The shaded area above represents the area in which the outcome 
differential is significant enough to induce the government to make 
an offer, but not so significant as to dissuade the defendant from 
entertaining the proposal.  
                                                                                                                 
 121. See Figure 3. 
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3.  Establishing and Distributing Available Benefits 
Once the parties determine that negotiations will occur due to the 
size of the outcome differential, the next part of the plea bargaining 
process is a determination by each party of acceptable terms. As with 
the calculation of the outcome differential, both the prosecution and 
the defense play significant roles in this evaluation. While the 
outcome differential calculation required analysis of all barriers to 
success at trial, this portion of the analysis focuses on the barriers to 
the success of the bargain itself. It is here that the institutional and 
psychological barriers to plea bargaining affect the eventual offer 
from the government and the final determination from the defendant 
regarding whether to accept.  
In the traditional shadow-of-trial plea bargaining theory, where the 
likelihood of success at trial is the only consideration and a reduction 
in sentence is the only incentive available from the government, one 
could predict that the size of the outcome differential and the 
sentencing differential would be similar. Therefore, where the 
outcome differential is high, both parties’ assessments of the 
appropriate and acceptable sentencing differential would also be 
high.122 This direct relationship is demonstrated in the model 
below.123    
                                                                                                                 
 122. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 1237, 1243–44 (2008) (“Most commentators that have advocated reform of plea bargaining 
have begun by criticizing the dramatic gap between plea and trial sentences. This differential, 
alternatively referred to as the ‘plea discount’ or ‘trial penalty,’ depending on the perspective, is 
indisputably the engine that drives the plea-bargaining machine.”).  
 123. See Figure 4. 























As illustrated in the model above, in a simplistic plea bargaining 
system the outcome differential and the sentencing differential track 
closely.  
Plea bargaining in the American criminal justice system, however, 
is a more complex endeavor. First, on a case-by-case basis the 
prosecution may be required to offer a particular defendant a 
sentencing differential that is higher than predicted based solely on 
the case’s outcome differential. Examples include cases where a 
defendant needs additional incentives to overcome a psychological 
barrier to pleading guilty or where the government will seek 
additional cooperation from the defendant after his or her conviction. 
Second, the prosecution may agree to hold back certain charges or 
prosecutorial options in return for a guilty plea. When such benefits 
are offered, the corresponding sentencing differential relating to the 
charges actually brought need not be as large to induce a defendant to 
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benefits defendants seek. Rather, defendants are often interested in 
other non-sentencing rewards, even if receipt of these benefits might 
result in a less significant sentencing differential. Because of these 
additional exchanges of benefits between each side of the bargain, the 
actual sentencing differential in each case may vary widely from that 
which would be predicted through examination of the outcome 
differential alone.124   
To account for the impact of the exchange of additional benefits 
described above and more accurately predict the impact of such 
exchanges on sentencing, an intermediary step must be added to plea 
bargaining models. This additional step reflects that the outcome 
differential is not directly related to the eventual sentencing 
differential but instead to the calculation of the appropriate pool of 
benefits available to the defendant in return for pleading guilty. 
Where the defendant’s chances of success at trial are high, the initial 
pool of available benefits will be high. Similarly, where the 
defendant’s chances of success at trial are low, the initial pool of 
available benefits will also be low. Below is a model of the initial 
pools of benefits in the three terrorism cases described herein.125  
 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Michael D. Cicchini, Broken Government Promises: A Contract-Based Approach to Enforcing 
Plea Bargains, 38 N.M.L. REV. 159, 159 (2008) (“Plea agreements take numerous forms and often 
involve many different types of concessions by both the government and the defendant.”).  
 125. See Figure 5. 






















 As discussed above, the initial pool of benefits available to 
defendants based on their outcome differential may then increase or 
decrease in size depending on several considerations. First, the 
government may increase a defendant’s available pool of benefits to 
overcome barriers to the success of the plea offer.126 Therefore, 
where a defendant is overconfident, this factor might not influence 
the outcome differential because it is not a barrier to the 
government’s success at trial but might be a barrier to the success of 
the plea bargain itself.127 As such, the government might offer the 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2496–2527 (discussing psychological barriers to 
plea bargaining). 
 127. There are many reasons a defendant might be ‘overconfident.’ One such reason is a belief by the 
defendant, whether true or imaginary, that he is innocent of the charged conduct. See Covey, supra note 
37, at 130 (“Plea bargaining’s pricing model misprices pleas in part because it fails to incorporate a 
critically important piece of information—the defendant’s subjective knowledge of guilt or innocence—
into the pricing mechanism.”). Another such reason might be that a defendant has no prior criminal 
convictions and, therefore, is more reluctant than a recidivist to accept a bargain that requires the 
establishment of a criminal record. See Wright, supra note 113 at 70 (“While recidivists do account for a 
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defendant an increase in the relative size of the available pool of 
benefits in exchange for the defendant abandoning this trait.128 
Second, the government may request additional benefits from the 
defendant beyond a willingness to plead guilty, such as an agreement 
to cooperate in future investigations or prosecutions.129 In such cases, 
the defendant’s available pool of benefits increases in size in return 
for the defendant’s agreement to satisfy the government’s additional 
request. Where the government agrees to increase a defendant’s 
available pool of benefits, as described above, the resulting impact is 
demonstrated below.130 
 
                                                                                                                 
of defendants who have no prior convictions. . . . [B]ecause the fact of convictions should concern these 
defendants more than the amount of punishment, they are more likely to hold out for a dismissal or an 
acquittal in a weak case.”). Consideration of such barriers to the success of plea bargains and their 
relative impact on the eventual sentencing differentials necessary to induce bargains is absent from the 
traditional shadow-of-trial formulas but are a central consideration in the benefit distribution theory.   
 128. It is important to understand that certain factors have broad implications and the potential to 
influence various aspects of the plea bargaining process. In fact, some factors, such as wealth, might 
impact both the assessment of the likelihood of success at trial and the evaluation of the actual plea 
agreement because they impact both structural and psychological influences. For instance, if a defendant 
is wealthy, he may have a stronger defense team, which would be a structural factor influencing the 
assessment of success at trial. At the same time, wealth and a strong defense team might encourage a 
defendant to be more risk averse, a psychological barrier to success of the plea bargain itself. As such, 
wealth might both increase the outcome differential and result in an increase in the relative size of the 
available pool of benefits to create a greater incentive for the defendant to plead guilty. See Bibas, 
Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–66. 
 129. See Cicchini, supra note 124, at 162 (“In many cases, defendants provide information that results 
in convictions for far more serious criminal behavior of co-actors, or even of individuals in unrelated 
cases. In short, the benefits flowing to the government from the plea bargaining system are numerous, 
far reaching, and incredibly valuable.”). 
 130. See Figure 6. 

























Third, just as the prosecution may act in a manner that increases 
the defendant’s available pool of benefits, the government may also 
act to diminish these available benefits. Most commonly, such 
diminutions occur where the prosecution has agreed to charge 
bargaining and will not utilize readily provable conduct to bring more 
severe charges or to apply harsher statutes, including statutes carrying 
mandatory minimum sentences. Obviously, where the prosecution 
agrees to forgo more serious charges in return for a guilty plea, it will 
not be necessary to also offer the defendant a significant pool of 
benefits for application when being sentenced for the conduct and 
charges actually contained in the plea agreement.131 As a result, a 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. OF 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 119, 130 (2009) (“[P]rosecutors make use of their charging discretion to engage in 
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defendant with a relatively large outcome differential may still have a 
small pool of available benefits for application at sentencing because 
the pool of available benefits has been significantly drained in return 
for the prosecution’s agreement not to bring additional or more 
aggressive charges.  
Once the size of the defendant’s available pool of benefits has been 
altered based on barriers to the success of the plea bargain, including 
considerations of benefits desired by the government beyond a mere 
plea of guilty and any agreements from the government regarding 
uncharged or under-charged conduct, the defendant’s role in the 
process once again becomes vital. At this stage of the negotiation, the 
defendant is able to influence the use of the remaining pool of 
benefits between sentencing and non-sentencing considerations. If the 
defendant seeks only to utilize the benefits pool to influence 
sentencing, the resulting sentencing differential will be relative in 
size to the total size of the available pool of benefits. However, if the 
defendant seeks other non-sentencing benefits, such as a 
recommendation regarding a particular prison or category of criminal 
offense for reasons related to social stigma, the applicable pool of 
benefits shrinks, resulting in a related diminution in the size of the 
eventual sentencing differential. This occurs because the defendant 
cannot increase the size of the available pool of benefits, and any 
specific requests, whether sentencing or non-sentencing, necessarily 
reduce the size of the remaining pool.132  
                                                                                                                 
‘charge bargaining’—plea bargaining with the accused in which the prosecutor offers a lighter sentence 
in return for a plea of guilty to a lesser charge.”); Wright & Miller, supra note 29, at 1414 (“The same 
set of facts can sustain various charges with varying penalties.”); Lynch, supra note 30, at 2132 (“There 
is, to be sure, an element of trading involved: the defendant does have an expensive set of procedural 
rights that can be invoked, and so always has at least something—the certainty and ease of a conviction 
that will not need to be processed through the adversarial judicial process—to trade to the prosecutor for 
a reduced charge.”). 
 132. See Figure 7. 
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 The three terrorism cases discussed in this article illustrate the 
manner in which the government may increase the available pool of 
benefits in return for additional concessions or cooperation; the 
manner in which the government may diminish the available pool of 
benefits in return for foregoing more aggressive charging; and the 
manner in which the defendant may influence the utilization of the 
final available pool of benefits. For instance, Reid was offered a more 
lenient sentence by the government in return for cooperation in 
ongoing terrorism investigations.133 Although Reid declined the offer, 
it demonstrates the government’s willingness to exchange 
cooperation for an increase in Reid’s available pool of benefits.134 
Had Reid accepted this offer, his sentencing differential would have 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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grown larger than that originally predicted by the outcome 
differential in his case. In the Lodi case, Hayat refused to plead guilty 
to a terrorism related charge.135 Although this decision did not play a 
significant role in his eventual sentence for a customs violation 
because he received a sentence of time served, it illustrates Hayat’s 
willingness to utilize some of his available pool of benefits in return 
for not being charged with an offense that carried a significant 
stigma.136 As a result, the remaining pool of benefits available to 
influence Hayat’s sentencing differential shrunk. Importantly, this 
decision was made by Hayat and illustrates once again that 
defendants do play a significant role in the plea bargaining machine. 
Finally, in the Lackawanna case, there is evidence that the defendants 
pleaded guilty, in part, in return for the government dropping 
conspiracy charges and because of concerns that the government 
would file even more serious charges if the case proceeded to trial.137 
There is also evidence that the government threatened to classify the 
defendants as enemy combatants if the cases did not settle at the plea 
bargaining stage.138 This is an example of the government reducing 
the relative size of the defendants’ available pool of benefits in return 
for an agreement not to bring more serious charges and, in a manner 
unique to terrorism cases, not labeling the defendants as enemy 
combatants. Such charging and classification concessions from the 
government certainly had a significant impact on the individuals’ 
final sentences and aid in explaining why the final sentencing 
differentials in these cases were not reflective of the initial 
assessment of the government’s likelihood of success at trial.  
                                                                                                                 
 135. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 136. Tempest & Bailey, supra note 76, at B7.  
 137. New York Man Admits to Attending al Qaeda Training Camp, supra note 102 (“[Mr. Goba’s 
lawyer said] his client had agreed to the plea deal . . . because of the possibility that the government 
could bring more serious charges, like treason.”).  
 138. Eric Lichtblau, supra note 98 (“Mr. Brown said his client had decided to plead guilty after 
prosecutors suggested that Mr. Mosed could be declared an enemy combatant and be held indefinitely 
without a lawyer, or be charged with treason and face execution.”); see Carl Takei, Terrorizing Justice: 
An Argument that Plea Bargains Struck Under the Threat of “Enemy Combatant” Detention Violate the 
Right to Due Process, 47 B.C. L. REV. 581, 584 (2006) (“When a prosecutor uses the threat of enemy 
combatant detention as leverage in a criminal case, the threat creates extraordinary pressure to plead 
guilty.”).  
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:2 
 
290 
4.  The Final Administrative Determination 
Once the first phase of the plea bargaining process is complete and 
the prosecution and defense have determined the applicable outcome 
differential, calculated the size of the defendant’s available pool of 
benefits, and determined how the benefits will be distributed between 
sentencing and non-sentencing related benefits, the second phase 
begins, which is the administrative phase.  
The administrative phase is a byproduct of the exhaustive first 
phase of the bargain and represents the government’s unilateral 
decision regarding the final offer that will be presented to the 
defendant. While the administrative theory of plea bargaining is 
correct that the government wields significant power during this 
phase and defendants often accept the government’s final 
determination of a just result, these acts must be considered in the 
context of the earlier role of the defense. Prior to the government 
shifting into its administrative role, the defendant influenced the 
prosecution’s determination regarding the strength of the case, the 
factors influencing the success of a plea offer, and the manner in 
which the offer would distribute benefits between sentencing and 
non-sentencing considerations. As such, the defendant’s influence in 
the second phase, though indirect, is significant.  
Furthermore, consideration must be given to the success of such 
offers by the government. Over 95% of defendants in the federal 
system plead guilty, most as part of a bargain with the government. 
While the administrative theory of plea bargaining argues that many 
of these defendants are forced to unwillingly accept the government’s 
offer, this appears to overly diminish the defendant’s true role in the 
plea bargaining process. Given the extensive role of the defendant in 
the first phase of the bargain, it is more likely that plea bargaining 
rates are high because most of the offers are considered reasonable by 
both parties, each having performed the analysis described above in 
phase one. Though it may be true that many defendants still feel a 
sense of despair at agreeing to the ultimate determination, for close to 
95% of defendants the offer is significant enough to create an 
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incentive to plead guilty.139 As such, the fact that the government 
controls this final phase of the process should not be interpreted to 
mean that defendants play no role in the operation of the plea 
bargaining machine; just as the fact that defendants control the 
ultimate decision whether to accept an offer or move forward to trial 
should not be interpreted to mean that the government is a mere 
bystander in the process as a whole.    
B.  Unilateral Plea Bargaining 
Regardless of whether bilateral plea negotiations occur, an 
important aspect of any guilty plea is consideration of the benefits 
associated with unilateral plea bargaining between the defendant and 
the criminal justice system. Under the theory of unilateral plea 
bargaining, defendants sometimes trade their right to a trial in return 
for the inherent benefits of pleading guilty. These inherent benefits 
are bestowed by the system and may encourage a plea of guilty 
regardless of whether the defendant is also entertaining an offer from 
the government.140   
                                                                                                                 
 139. The significance of defense counsel in the plea bargaining process must not be overlooked. 
Defense counsel plays a significant role in the parties’ assessments of the likelihood of success at trial 
and the evaluation of barriers to the success of the plea negotiations. Beyond this, defense counsel also 
serves as a guide for the defendant, assisting him or her in navigating the process, voicing the 
defendant’s positions, concerns, and desired distribution of benefits, and helping the defendant analyze 
and consider the available alternatives. As such, a poor defense attorney might act as an additional 
barrier to the success of the plea bargain itself, should he or she fail to properly counsel the defendant 
regarding the risks and realities of the criminal process. Alschuler, supra note 116, at 680 (“The practice 
of plea bargaining often transforms criminal defense attorneys from courtroom champions into the point 
men and women of a coercive system. The principle function of counsel is to explain to their clients just 
how the legal system’s armaments work and to force these clients to recognize the coercive power of the 
alternatives they face.”). 
 140. One form of unilateral plea bargaining not discussed at length in this article occurs when an 
individual confesses to the charged conduct to demonstrate a commitment to the ideology that inspired 
his or her acts. An example of this type of defendant is “Times Square Bomber” Faisal Shahzad, who 
attempted to detonate an S.U.V. full of explosives in New York’s Times Square on May 1, 2010. 
Shahzad entered a plea of guilty to terrorism charges in June 2010 and stated, “I want to plead guilty, 
and I’m going to plead guilty 100 times over.” Benjamin Weiser & Colin Moynihan, A Guilty Plea in 
Plot to Bomb Times Square, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A1. Shahzad went on to state, “I am part of 
the answer to the U.S. terrorizing the Muslim nations and the Muslim people.” Scott Shane, Wars 
Fought and Wars Googled, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at WK1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/weekinreview/27shane.html. While Shahzad’s decision to plead 
guilty is interesting, it adds little to our understanding of the plea bargaining machine or the motivations 
that encourage a large majority of terrorism defendants to select plea bargaining over trial. This is 
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1.  Stigma and Plea Bargaining 
While a thorough examination of all of the inherent benefits of 
pleading guilty is outside the scope of this article, there are three such 
benefits for consideration in the terrorism cases discussed above. 
First, and almost entirely overlooked in existing plea bargaining 
literature, is consideration of stigma. Stigma is an “external incentive 
founded on the reluctance of individuals to interact with a person 
who breaches social norms.”141 While all manner of criminal 
behavior creates varying levels of stigma, being labeled a “terrorist” 
is perhaps one of the most stigmatizing.142 Although stigma is most 
closely linked to the actual perpetrator of the crime, family members 
can also suffer from its adverse affects.143 As one commentator noted, 
                                                                                                                 
because Shahzad could have achieved the same result by going to trial. Recall that in 2006, Zacarias 
Moussaoui proceeded to trial and then used the stand as a mechanism to boast of his involvement in the 
9/11 plot. Lewis, supra note 50. As such, Shahzad’s decision to plead guilty appears to say less about 
the plea bargaining machine and more about his own forum preferences for asserting his allegiance to 
terrorism. Further, it may in fact be the case that Shahzad is actually motivated by one of the unilateral 
plea bargaining considerations discussed at length in this piece, but, unlike Richard Reid and others, he 
has chosen to mask his true motivations.   
 141. Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May 
Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 362 (2007) (“[S]tigma operates by limiting and 
constraining both social and commercial opportunities. These constraints are the by-product of the 
willingness of individual—private enforcers—to punish the perpetrators of crime by limiting social or 
professional interactions with them.”); see also ANTON J. M. DIJKER & WILLEM KOOMEN, 
STIGMATIZATION, TOLERANCE AND REPAIR: AN INTEGRATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF 
RESPONSES TO DEVIANCE 6 (2007) (“Stigmatization is a type of social control that does not distinguish 
between a person and his or her deviant behavior or temporary condition, that is aimed at excluding the 
person from a relationship or society.”). 
 142. See Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 131 (2009) (“The stigma attached to an individual who is thought of as a 
potential terrorist is, needless to say, extremely high. Indeed, to be mistakenly identified as a suspected 
terrorist would be a nightmare of extraordinary proportions.”) (quoting Justin Florence, Note, Making 
the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watch Lists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2153 (2006)). 
 143. See Farkas & Miller, supra note 58, at 90 (“A ‘courtesy stigma’ is attached to families, which 
results in their social marginalization, even though they did not commit a sex offense. For many family 
members, their identities as spouses, parents, siblings, and children are suspended while they try to 
negotiate their daily lives.”). See generally SOCIAL WORK AND DISADVANTAGE: ADDRESSING THE 
ROOTS OF STIGMA THROUGH ASSOCIATION (Peter Burke & Jonathan Parker eds., 2007) (discussing 
stigma by association); Sally Mason, et al., Developing a Measure of Stigma by Association with African 
American Adolescents Whose Mothers Have HIV, 20 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 65 (2010) (discussing 
familial stigma suffered by those whose family members have HIV); Cristina Parfene, et al., Epilepsy 
Stigma and Stigma by Association in the Workplace, 15 EPILEPSY & BEHAV. 461 (2009) (discussing 
stigma by association); P. Werner & J. Heinik, Stigma by Association and Alzheimer’s Disease, 12 
AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 92 (2008) (examining stigma by association with regard to Alzheimer’s 
disease); Patrick W. Corrigan, et al., Blame, Shame, and Contamination: The Impact of Mental Illness 
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“Family members [of offenders] report being ostracized and 
disrespected by neighbors, lifetime acquaintances, and relatives 
because of their . . . offender connections. They feel constantly 
watched by neighbors and others in the community.”144 As another 
commentator stated, “[B]ecause the offender has committed an act 
which is socially unacceptable, his family members are often thought 
of as criminals, too.”145 Further, although scholarship on stigma and 
criminal law has focused on the deterrent force of the concept, it is 
equally true that stigma can be motivational.146 In the case of Reid, 
the possibility that reference to al Qaeda might be removed from his 
indictment and the ability to avoid a trial, both of which he believed 
would reduce the stigma suffered by his family as a result of his 
actions, created an incentive for him to plead guilty.147 While the 
benefit of avoiding familial stigma will rarely be a sufficient 
incentive for a defendant to plead guilty where the government’s case 
is less than assured, where the defendant’s conviction is highly likely 
at trial, preventing the pain and lasting negative consequences of an 
internationally publicized spectacle might well be enough to result in 
                                                                                                                 
and Drug Dependence Stigma on Family Members, 20 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 239 (2006) (examining stigma 
associated with family members suffering from mental illness and drug dependence); Susan B. 
Goldstein & Vera A. Johnson, Stigma by Association: Perceptions of the Dating Partners of College 
Students with Physical Disabilities, 19 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 495 (1997) (discussing 
associational stigma related to interaction with individuals with disabilities). 
 144. Farkas & Miller, supra note 58, at 90; see also Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of I. Lewis 
Libby in U.S. v. Libby, CR. NO. 05-394 (RBW), 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 33, 42 (2007) (“The public 
nature of Mr. Libby’s indictment, trial, and conviction will ensure that he and his family carry the stigma 
of those convictions forever. The impact of Mr. Libby’s convictions, on himself and his family, is 
profound and devastating. It will continue to be so, regardless of the sentence this Court chooses to 
impose.”). 
 145. Susan H. Fishman, Losing a Loved One to Incarceration: The Effect of Imprisonment on Family 
Members, 59 PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J. 372, 373 (1981); see also RACHEL CONDRY, FAMILIES 
SHAMED: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FOR RELATIVES OF SERIOUS OFFENDERS 61–93 (2007) 
(discussing secondary stigma). Condry states: 
In our society . . . the ties that bind kin together are strong enough for dishonour to flow 
from the actions of one relative to another, and for a family to have a reputation which 
can be damaged by the actions of one member. When those actions comprise some of the 
most grave and vilified crimes in our society, the whole family can be tainted with the 
resulting stigma. 
Id. at 61–62. 
 146. Rasmusen, supra note 107, at 540 (1996) (“Once the criminal’s behavior becomes known, other 
individuals become more reluctant to interact with him. This private reluctance may be as powerful a 
disincentive to crime as public punishment.”).   
 147. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
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a plea of guilty. For Reid, this benefit was enough, and he accepted 
the deal.148 
2.  The Financial and Psychological Costs of Trial 
Second, defendants are often motivated to plead guilty by 
consideration of the financial and psychological costs of trial on both 
themselves and their families.149 While it may be desirable to 
exercise one’s right to trial in hopes of exoneration, the collateral 
costs of selecting this course are often untenable. Consider the 
choices made by Umer Hayat in the Lodi case. Hayat indicated that 
he pleaded guilty because of the incentives offered by the 
government and the reality that a plea bargain would spare himself 
and his family the costs of a second trial.150 As with considerations of 
stigma, defendants’ decisions to spare themselves and their families 
the financial and psychological costs of trial are not properly 
categorized as benefits granted by the prosecution. More accurately, 
these are benefits inherent to the plea bargaining system and offered 
in each case where the defendant embraces the option of pleading 
guilty. Furthermore, it is important to observe that in the Hayat 
matter, as opposed to the Reid case, the defendant was motivated to 
plead guilty by a combination of benefits offered by the prosecution 
and benefits inherent to the system.151     
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. (discussing Richard Reid’s decision to plead guilty).  
 149. See Josh Bowers, The Unusual Man in the Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 260, 261 (2009), 
available at http://www.pennumbra.com/response/05-2009/Bowers.pdf (“[O]nce an innocent defendant 
is arrested and charged wrongfully, the costs of proceeding to an imperfect trail often swamp the costs of 
pleading to lenient bargains.”); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 728 (2008) (“A grand jury must determine whether sufficient evidence exists 
to justify a trial, and an affirmative decision will subject a criminal defendant to the economic, personal, 
reputational, and psychological costs of standing trial and defending against the indictment’s charges.”); 
O’Hear, supra note 31, at 418–19 (“Prosecutors can act in a high-handed way because few defendants 
can afford to go to trial. The costs of trial extend far beyond the litigation expenses. . . . For those who 
secure pretrial release, there will be a desire to draw tedious, inconvenient, and sometimes humiliating 
court appearances to an end.”). 
 150. See supra Part II.B (discussing Umer Hayat’s motivation for pleading guilty).  
 151. The Reid case and the Hayat case demonstrate the manner in which bilateral and unilateral plea 
bargaining can either operate independently or in tandem during a case. While some defendants, such as 
Reid, will find the benefits of unilateral plea bargaining sufficient in and of themselves to give up their 
right to trial, other defendants, such as Hayat, will only acquiesce to the plea bargaining machine in 
return for the combined benefits of each. Further, other defendants may not be interested in the benefits 
 
2011] PLEA BARGAINING  
 
295 
3.  Additional Institutional Benefits 
Finally, in determining whether to plead guilty, a defendant might 
also consider the credit received under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility or other institutional 
advantages not controlled by the prosecution, such as currying favor 
with the judge regarding a requested prison assignment. For example, 
under the federal sentencing guidelines, a defendant who is 
determined by the court to have “accepted responsibility” is eligible 
for a reduction in their offense level of two points, even where the 
government objects.152 Importantly, in the comments, the guidelines 
state the following regarding guilty pleas:  
This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts 
the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the 
essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then 
admits guilt and expresses remorse. . . . Entry of a plea of guilty 
prior to the commencement of trial combined with truthfully 
admitting the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and 
truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional 
relevant conduct for which he is accountable under § 1B1.3 . . . , 
will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of 
responsibility for the purposes of subsection (a).153 
Where defendants become eligible for a reduction in their offense 
level because they have pleaded guilty, the eventual sentencing 
benefits may be significant, even without additional benefits from the 
government. For instance, defendants charged with conduct resulting 
in an offense level of nine will face a minimum of four months in 
                                                                                                                 
inherent to pleading guilty, and will find motivation only in the benefits being offered by the 
government.    
 152. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2009). Where the government supports a 
defendant’s receipt of credit for acceptance of responsibility, the defendant may be eligible for an 
additional point reduction. Id. § 3E1.1(b).   
 153. Id. § 3E1.1, comments 2–3 (2009); see also Sentencing, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 
681, 698–99 (2009) (“Reductions based on defendants’ acceptance of responsibility have withstood 
challenges that they violate defendants’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Fifth 
Amendment right to due process, and Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.”). 
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prison if convicted at trial, but may be sentenced to probation if they 
receive credit for pleading guilty. Further, defendants charged with 
conduct resulting in an offense level of forty-three will face a 
mandatory sentence of life in prison. In return for a guilty plea, 
however, the same defendants may be eligible for a sentence of just 
twenty-seven years in prison. Although twenty-seven years is a 
significant period of incarceration, for a defendant aged eighteen at 
the time of conviction, this means the difference between release 
when he or she is forty-five years old or spending the rest of his or 
her natural life behind bars.154 The inherent benefits available under 
the sentencing guidelines may not be sufficient to motivate all 
defendants to plead guilty, but they may be sufficient for some, with 
or without the offer of additional benefits from the government.  
Although most of the above described considerations have 
traditionally been considered outside the scope of the plea bargaining 
machine, they should properly be included within any model of plea 
bargaining as they can significantly impact a defendant’s decision 
whether to plead guilty. Furthermore, while the government can 
certainly bring these benefits to the attention of the defense, they 
cannot control them, and, therefore, a defendant’s consideration of 
unilateral plea bargaining benefits is once again an example of the 
significant role played by defendants in the operation of the machine.  
CONCLUSION 
Two theories have dominated recent scholarship regarding the 
operation of a system that leads to over 95% of defendants pleading 
guilty. While the administrative theory argues that prosecutors have 
become so powerful that they force defendants to accept plea 
bargains in which they alone determine the appropriate punishment, 
the shadow-of-trial theory contends that both prosecutors and 
defendants participate in the plea bargaining process like a 
                                                                                                                 
 154. This calculation includes consideration of “good time,” which permits a 15% reduction in a 
federal inmate’s sentence for good behavior while in prison. Such “good time” does not apply to inmates 
who are sentenced to terms of life in prison.   
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contractual negotiation. As is so often the case, both appear to be 
correct and represent different portions of the plea bargaining 
process.  
Plea bargaining is a much larger machine than many have 
previously articulated, and, within this machine, there are two distinct 
types of bargain. First, both the defense and the prosecution play 
active roles in bilateral negotiations, each influencing the others’ 
determination until, at the end of the process, the government makes 
its final administrative determination of a just result. This is not a 
process where defendants are subjected to the whims of the 
government without any voice or participation, but rather a complex 
evaluation of the barriers to success at trial and the barriers to success 
of the plea bargain itself. Plea bargaining has triumphed, therefore, 
because the process effectively captures both parties' interests and 
resolves the conflict in a manner appealing to all but a handful of 
defendants. Second, defendants, even without engaging in bilateral 
negotiations, may engage in unilateral bargaining and accept the 
inherent benefits of pleading guilty. In this second type of bargain, 
defendants assert themselves as independent actors, accepting the 
rewards of pleading guilty even where the government exerts no 
control. Regardless of whether defendants engage in bilateral 
bargaining, unilateral bargaining, or both, they are an important and 
vital aspect of the plea bargaining machine.  
It is true that there are many factors, rational and irrational, known 
and unknown, that influence the decisions in each case regarding 
whether a plea bargain will be offered and whether it will be 
accepted. The benefit distribution model of plea bargaining described 
in this work is a first step towards compartmentalizing the inner 
workings of the plea bargaining machine and isolating the stages at 
which varying factors influence the ultimate decisions of the 
government regarding the offer it will present and of the defendant 
regarding whether to accept. Although much research remains to 
delve into the inner reaches of the plea bargaining machine and 
explore the operation of this process that captures 95% of defendants, 
the benefit distribution model offers a mechanism through which to 
conduct this future research. Plea bargaining is not a perfect system 
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to resolve criminal cases, and it presents many areas for concern. The 
initial steps to correcting its deficiencies, however, cannot come until 
there is a better understanding of its operation. Through this and 
future research, one can strive to better the criminal justice system in 
the United States, a system which is, for all intents and purposes, the 
plea bargaining machine itself.  
 
